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INCLUDING

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by Ian Livingstone

Traffic Problems in Nigeria
by F. D. C. Wijesinghe

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by Satya Deva

Public Administration in Mauritius
by Martin Minogue

BOOK REVIEWS
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Editor's Notes

We make no apology for publishing a third article on Kenya's Special Rural Development Programme, for we welcome the opportunity to follow J. W. Leach's account in 1974, and Colin Fuller's article in 1975, with Ian Livingstone's present assessment.

How to achieve effective integrated rural development is a major problem to most African countries and it is a major problem to such donor countries as Britain who give priority in their aid programmes to helping the poorest rural communities. The SRDP was a novel experiment in this field, it enjoyed some successes and it suffered failures. Rural areas are the least responsive to innovation unless and until its worth is proven. SRDP helped to expose the deficiencies which were a constraint on the programme, weaknesses at local and central level, reluctance to innovate, "preference for bureaucracy and routine" – there is useful food for thought here not just for the Government of Kenya but for other developing countries and for aid donors as well.

Nigeria is one African country where private enterprise can still be encouraged and Mr. Wijesinghe in discussing Nigerian traffic problems comes down strongly on the side of the entrepreneurs, arguing effectively for free competition between road and rail so as to ensure that the public in general and the poor of Nigeria in particular, can benefit from the cheapest effective means of transport.

From Nigerian optimism we turn to Indian pessimism. Satya Deva in his study of two particular industrial estates in the Punjab, one urban, the other rural, paints a gloomy picture of bureaucratic procrastination and incompetence. Much time and money consumed in discussing, planning, replanning and finally establishing estates which entrepreneurs then proved by no means anxious to occupy – for a variety of reasons, most of which careful planning should have foreseen. There is a lesson to be learnt from Dr. Deva's cautionary tale, on how *not* to set up new enterprises, and a lesson too on the need for careful impartial preliminary study before policy decisions are reached and public expenditure incurred. One must hope that elsewhere in India there are examples of thriving industrial estates to offset the lack of success in the Punjab.

Finally Martin Minogue examines the public service in Mauritius. He traces attempts, between 1955 and 1967, to introduce administrative reform so as to meet the challenge of constitutional change – attempts that achieved very little because the reports on which they were based were largely ignored. Now he sees the need for administrative reform more urgent than ever if the public service is to meet successfully the new challenge of implementing social and economic development plans of its independent island government.

Rural Development in Kenya: The S.R.D.P. Revisited

By IAN LIVINGSTONE

Mr. Livingstone is a Reader in Economics at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne and was a Visiting Research Professor in the Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi, in 1974–75.

IN a previous issue of this Journal, J. W. Leach outlined the genesis and development of the Kenya Special Rural Development Programme (S.R.D.P.) up to March, 1973[1]. The special feature of the programme was the emphasis on experimentation, making use of a number of pilot areas in which innovations would be attempted with a view to replication elsewhere in Kenya when successful. Initially fourteen pilot areas were selected but subsequently the programme focused on just six representative areas located in different parts of Kenya: Migori, in Nyanza Province, Vihiga, Western Province, Kapenguria in the extreme north-west, in Rift Valley Province, Tetu in Central Province, Mbere in Eastern Province, and Kwale, in the Coast Province. The programme was a substantial one and is worth reviewing particularly because of its two experimental elements: (a) it incorporated a new and experimental system of rural development administration, a new method of 'managing' rural development, and (b) under this method of management individual innovations and experimental programmes were to be promoted over the whole range of economic and social activity. Although the programme was intended, through the management system particularly, to develop Kenya's own capacity to manage rural development, it has attracted a number of aid donors who have 'adopted' different areas, specifically the Swedish International Development Agency (S.I.D.A.) and F.A.O. (Migori), U.S.A.I.D. (Vihiga), the Netherlands (Kapenguria), Norway (Mbere) and O.D.M. (Kwale). The Kenya government itself provided all financing in Tetu. A further question of interest, therefore, is whether the programme has provided a useful medium for the injection of capital, particularly foreign assistance, into the rural sector.

The programme became operational in the financial year 1971–72 and, although in 1972 a review of the progress of the programme was carried out by the Institute of Development Studies (I.D.S.) in the University of Nairobi, and a substantial evaluation report published[2], it was too early at that time for a proper evaluation, given the required gestation period for the new rural development system itself, as well as for the many development projects

[1] J. W. Leach, The Kenya Special Rural Development Programme, *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Volume XIII, No. 2, April, 1974.

[2] *An Overall Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme*. Occasional Paper No. 8, Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi, November, 1972.

organised under it. In late 1974, however, a second I.D.S. evaluation was requested by the Ministry of Planning, and a voluminous report has recently been published[3]. The present writer was a member of the evaluation team. This article draws on the collaborative work of the team, while representing the writer's own interpretation of the lessons of S.R.D.P.

A new approach to rural development administration

A number of new administrative features were associated with S.R.D.P. One significant aspect, the importance of which may not in fact have been fully realised, was the geographical size of the unit selected, which generally consisted of just one or two divisions within a District. This means in effect that this represented an exercise in *sub*-District planning, as opposed to District planning or regional planning, which is more commonly emphasized.

Secondly, the special post of Area Co-ordinator was created, of District Officer rank but *outside* the normal administrative machinery. He was freed of general administration duties such as 'law and order' and other local government tasks and *only* concerned with development projects: his task was to co-ordinate the efforts of the local officers attached to different Ministries into an area development planning exercise. The Area Co-ordinator was assisted by a Project Committee comprising these officers, together with the local Member of Parliament, three other local leaders, and a representative of local voluntary agencies, plus the external advisor provided by the aid donor in most cases. This committee would meet three times a year to initiate and check on the progress of projects.

There was, thirdly, a management information system, known as the Programming and Implementation Management System (P.I.M.). This involved a much more formal set of planning procedures than is common at the local area level, at least in Africa. In particular as part of an 'Annual Programming Exercise' the component operations of each selected project were identified, listed in sequence, and scheduled for completion by specific dates. Phasing forms and bar charts were then used to check on the progress of individual projects so that failure to complete an operation on time could be traced and provoke discussion. Project charts, together with triennial reports to the Project Committee, could provide a focus for team discussion of problems arising in any part of the area development programme, which were thus open to discussion outside the Ministry most directly concerned.

An extension of this in the form of a field management system for extension staff was devised in 1971 by two I.D.S. researchers, Belshaw and Chambers. In practice this was applied mainly to agricultural extension staff in Mbere, but also tried out with home economics assistants and, in a revised form, with livestock assistants in that area. The system involved detailed planning and recording of the daily activities of extension assistants, together with the results of farm visits.

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[3] *The Second Overall Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme*, Occasional Paper No. 12, February, 1976.

A final organisational innovation was the link-man system aimed at reducing bureaucracy and improving communications between headquarters and officers in the field. Under this system a fairly senior officer in each of the central Ministries was designated link-man for S.R.D.P. matters: Area Co-ordinators were able to contact these directly to raise queries, sort out problems or accelerate decisions.

Projects developed under S.R.D.P.

This new approach to development administration has to be judged mainly from the point of view of its *output:* the quantity and quality of projects which were promoted under it and their degree of success. We turn first to consider these projects, therefore, before looking in more detail at the system itself.

In the assessment referred to, Leach pointed with some pride to the fact that by December, 1972, there were already a total of 123 sub-programmes, deciding that "after 18 months' running this showed a substantial improvement in the Government's capacity to plan and implement development at the local level". (p. 360). A list of project titles does not prove, however, that the projects were actually operational, raising productivity, or likely to be successfully carried through to fulfill their objectives: otherwise satisfaction could be obtained from the fact that their number had increased from 123 to 188 by December, 1974. Close analysis of 188 separate sub-projects is a difficult assignment. It was the task of the 1974–75 I.D.S. evaluation team to report on the progress of as many of these projects as possible, but even with 19 members it was not possible to do a uniformly thorough job. Nevertheless, a fairly complete coverage of all these projects was attempted.

The experimental content of S.R.D.P. projects

Since the focus of S.R.D.P. was on experimentation with potentially replicable projects, the first question to ask is how far new and experimental projects and programmes were initiated. The collective view of the team on this aspect was solicited by means of a questionnaire (given the large number of projects rather than the size of the team) and the results are given in Table 1. The table is based on a specific definition of an experimental/replicable project. We may distinguish two categories of innovative projects: those which are purely experimental, or have an experimental component, in the context of Kenya as a whole and which could therefore, if successful, be copied elsewhere; and those which are innovative *only in relation to the particular part of Kenya concerned* and represent activities or methods already in use elsewhere. Table 1 (*opposite*) is limited to the former category of genuinely experimental activities.

Given that the table covers the whole range of activity in six different areas over a period of four years, the list is rather short. It has to be taken into account also that a certain amount of experimental activity would have gone on in these areas anyway; and in particular that the Kenya government found it convenient to locate some national experimental

Table 1. Experimental Projects established under S.R.D.P.

All Areas	1. women's programmes 2. functional literacy
Vihiga	3. labour-intensive road 4. family planning 5. maize credit scheme 6. agricultural input supply 7. tea expansion (credit element)
Migori	8. stockist credit scheme for hybrid maize development 9. group extension and agricultural village committees 10. crop storage extension 11. model dairy farms
Tetu	12. mobile family planning unit 13. dairy production experiment 14. hybrid maize extension for less progressive farmers
Mbere	15. health services extension project 16. management and reporting system for extension staff 17. agri-service station (not strongly pursued)
Kapenguria	18. rural access roads
Kwale	Nil, beyond 1 and 2

programmes, such as functional literacy for example, in the S.R.D.P. areas rather than elsewhere: programmes which certainly do not owe their existence to S.R.D.P. The list also excludes a number of new or experimental development projects – group ranching, village polytechnics, 4-K clubs, day-care centres, for example – which are not confined to S.R.D.P. areas and cannot therefore be said to have emerged from the programme.

Why such a shortage of experimental projects? A partial cause was probably an incomplete appreciation of the principal objective of S.R.D.P: but more fundamentally, perhaps, there does seem to have been a scarcity of ideas for useful innovation and experiment. It may be that it was too much to expect local officers to initiate a great many original projects rather than involve themselves in the already difficult task of implementation and administration. Central Ministries, through their Planning Units, are probably much better placed, in collaboration with local area officers, for working out possible new approaches and activities, and although decentralisation of decision-making was one objective of S.R.D.P. the failure of central ministries to involve themselves much more directly and positively in the six areas appears to have been a major weakness. The fact that the Ministry of Finance seems to have insisted in no more than a mild way on the experimental content of the projects being put up for funding would aggravate this.

This rather pessimistic conclusion must be qualified. A good deal of innovation of our second type was carried out on a local basis in a number

of S.R.D.P. areas. The degree of experimentation was certainly increased, and some of the experimental programmes initiated did produce some important and useful results. In the agricultural field the number of crop development schemes of various types was close to forty, about 12 of these showing positive results and 14 negative results, with others in process. Significant and sometimes striking increases in acreage of hybrid maize were obtained in Migori, Tetu and Kapenguria, as well as tea in Vihiga, soya beans in Migori, sunflower seed in Kapenguria, and Mexican 142 beans in Mbere. Two very important results were obtained in the area of agricultural extension: a new approach focusing on groups of farmers in Migori demonstrated the possibility of reaching many times more farmers without loss of effectiveness; while in Tetu an extension method directed towards less progressive and average farmers rather than to the usual target of progressive farmers showed good results. These two approaches in combination might with further testing even be developed as the basis of a new rural development strategy in Kenya. Among other programmes the Vihiga labour-intensive roads programme, under which a considerable amount of data on alternative construction methods was collected, produced some valuable results. The family planning programme in Vihiga, which was to measure in one local area whether intensification of family planning methods could bring any significantly greater response, can be said to have produced hopeful, if mixed results.

Certainly a number of important results, both positive and negative, have been obtained from S.R.D.P. projects. But the general impression is of the difficulty of initiating major social and economic change in the rural sector, and the need for a cautious, though still determined approach, with constant monitoring and testing of the results.

Effects on the quality of project preparation and implementation

Apart from the specifically experimental element of the projects, it might be hoped that the general quality of project preparation would improve under the S.R.D.P., given its main focus on an improved management system with phasing and monitoring of projects. It is difficult to make a general assessment here, but some idea can be obtained simply from an examination of the project lists. The descriptions of projects offered are frequently inadequate, usually not indicating what the specific activity or project is, let alone what aspect of it is innovative or experimental. Often only general headings are given such as 'community development' in Mbere or 'tea, coffee, pyrethrum, maize, dairy products' in Tetu. In part, of course, this is merely the result of providing minimum headings under which funds might be allocated. But it seems at least symptomatic of a failure to define clearly what constitutes a development project. It would also tend to blur in the minds of the officers concerned the distinction between experimental or innovatory projects and the ordinary ongoing activities of the department. The fact that the Ministry of Finance was willing to accept such poor definitions when allocating funds indicates some weakness in project planning at the centre itself, and a weakness in S.R.D.P. organisation as a whole.

These weaknesses are reflected also in the fact that some projects are still listed which are no longer being pursued, or perhaps were not in the end started at all. In an active programme, particularly an experimental one, we should expect the list of projects to change, as projects are completed, unsuccessful ones terminated and new ones initiated. The current (1975) list of projects for Tetu is actually identical with the original S.R.D.P. proposal prepared in December, 1969.

There are other examples of poor definition of projects. Included in the projects are items which are strictly speaking not development projects at all. Some are ordinary social expenditures, such as a show ground in Mbere and 'social halls' in Tetu. Some are only component aspects of some other project or programme and cannot be said to generate a stream of outputs or benefits directly themselves. For instance building cattle dips may be part of a programme for introducing dairy cattle into an area, which would then be a dairy 'project', but constructing two or three additional cattle dips in one part of Kenya could not be so described. Many other projects on the lists should more properly be considered part of the normal ongoing activity of the departments concerned: expanding water supply for domestic consumption (listed as projects in two areas) or co-operative marketing (listed in Mbere and Migori). Other projects listed are either not experimental or not limited to S.R.D.P. areas: village polytechnics, for instance, which are widely distributed throughout the country.

These rather unsatisfactory lists can be explained away to some extent. It is to be expected that the local areas would wish to impress headquarters and interested observers with the longest possible list. The attempt to find projects under every departmental head was bound to increase the number of non-experimental projects and items which are not genuine 'projects'. This would be done not only for internal diplomatic reasons but also to permit Area Co-ordinators to secure more funds, and funds for as many different developments as possible. Nevertheless, these are pressures which might have been resisted or might have been made unnecessary by a more diligent search for good innovative projects.

The S.R.D.P. as an experiment in development administration

While the number and quality of projects emerging from the S.R.D.P. could have been greater, we need to assess directly the main experiment under the S.R.D.P., which was the S.R.D.P. itself, as a system of rural development administration. The question here is how far the special administrative features of S.R.D.P. were successful and whether they can be adopted more widely in an improved system. The decision has now been taken in Kenya to adopt a system of District development planning, as opposed, for instance, to regional plans or other area plans. This is well advanced, in fact, with some Districts already having submitted draft Development Plans. The question specifically to be asked, therefore, is what lessons have been learned from S.R.D.P. for District Development Planning in Kenya, as well as more generally for the organisation of rural development efforts.

From the point of view of the specific question, it could be said that the S.R.D.P. had some poorly designed features from the start. If the

administrative unit was to remain the District, as was always envisaged, apart from possible moves towards a larger unit through regional plans, a development administration system based on one or two Divisions within a District was not ideally suited to serving as a prototype experimental model. For several reasons the S.R.D.P. model is not simply District Planning 'writ small'. First, it is currently difficult enough to find sufficient appointees of the right calibre for the post of District Planning Officer, the District equivalent of the Area Co-ordinator, let alone the far larger number of Area Co-ordinators that would be required if the smaller geographical unit were adopted. In addition, while the Area Co-ordinator was working outside the usual administrative machinery, under special arrangements, a District Planning Officer would much less easily escape from this machinery unless this was specifically re-designed. The use of a 'link-man' is feasible only so long as he has to deal with a limited number of areas: a single officer could not possibly deal in a parallel way with affairs relating to all Districts or Divisions of Kenya. For these reasons, although the S.R.D.P. offers a number of useful and important lessons, it must leave open the question of exactly how a new District-level planning system would be organised.

The innovation of having a senior officer, the Area Co-ordinator, charged solely with a co-ordinating, development planning function, does appear to have been successful, although success has depended on the quality and drive of the appointee and, just as much, the degree of co-operation secured by him from the District administrations, which varied considerably in their commitment to the objectives of S.R.D.P. A major weakness in the position of the Area Co-ordinator was that he had, for the most part, no funds at his control: this limitation might not hold in District planning and the position of the Area Co-ordinator, or his equivalent, correspondingly strengthened.

The Programming and Implementation Management System, whereby projects were phased and monitored, appears to have been reasonably successful also. One Area Co-ordinator judged P.I.M. to be "perhaps the best thing associated with S.R.D.P." The system appears to have given officers a greater sense of development 'purpose', and to have acted as a focus for improving team work at the local level, breaking down to some extent the deadening 'routine' approach to government work.

As already noted, the system failed to produce a radical improvement in the description of projects. What needs to be stressed, of course, is that it is not a system for project evaluation or selection, but merely a device for checking the timing and implementation of projects, and for revealing deficiencies and problems as they arise. Nevertheless, the poorness of project preparation revealed at the local level only underlines the need for some more systematized approach, and the need to persevere with efforts in this direction.

The Field Staff Management System (F.S.M.S.) tried out in Mbere was abandoned after a relatively brief life after the expatriates mainly involved with its organisation had left. It had proved time-consuming and imposed close checks on the activities of field assistants which were not always welcome. The system nevertheless did produce more direction and purpose in the work of agricultural assistants, and its abandonment rather than its modification, perhaps, appears unfortunate.

The S.R.D.P. as a form of integrated rural development

In recent years, in many developing countries, a stated aim, in regional plans especially, has been that of securing 'integrated' rural development planning, implying a significant degree of co-ordination between different projects and development activities. It is worth asking, therefore, whether such co-ordination of activities was carried out under S.R.D.P.

In fact, not many examples of co-ordination of interdependent activities can be cited, and there are examples of lack of co-operation and sometimes of the pursuit of different goals by different Ministries, as for instance in Mbere, where the Land Adjudication Department issued individual land titles in an area which the Range Management Division was attempting to develop group ranching on the basis of group titles. There have been very partial attempts in some areas at integrated plans; the original idea in Kapenguria was to develop trade and exchange between a newly-commercialised lowland area, based on livestock, and the highland area, producing crops[4], and in Kwale a 'sequential master plan' exists in proposal form though it is unlikely to be implemented.

The aim of integrated development is implied in some statements of S.R.D.P. objectives. Leach, for instance, describes[5] the official objectives as follows:

> 'The primary objective is to increase rural incomes and employment opportunities. The secondary objective is to establish procedures and techniques for accelerated and self-generating rural development which can be repeated in other similar areas and, in particular, to improve the development capacity of Kenya Government officials in the field.'

In fact, the two objectives of significant local expansion of income and employment, on the one hand, and useful experimentation on the other, were probably incompatible. The funds available for S.R.D.P. were simply insufficient for a substantial development impact to be reasonably expected, according to one estimate[6] amounting to only about 12-14 per cent of District development expenditures. It could be said, in fact, that S.R.D.P. fell between the two stools of experimentation and innovation, on the one hand, and integrated area development on the other. General development spending, on expensive infrastructural projects such as local roads, for example, would reduce the finance available for genuinely experimental projects substantially; while the latter projects could not be expected to have a large immediate impact. Projects which might make the greatest contribution to integrated rural development, apart from roads, are perhaps the introduction into an area of new activities which have already been proven elsewhere, involving innovation in one sense but also replication. We might note also that the use of S.R.D.P. funds for what may be described as ongoing activities of departments further reduced the amounts available for genuine experimentation.

[4] See the section by C. Barnes in the 1972 Evaluation Report.
[5] *Leach, loc. cit.*, p. 359.
[6] Second IDS Evaluation Report.

There was one major way in which the S.R.D.P. did constitute an effort in integrated rural development, of course, and that was in its new development administration system. The activities of the Area Co-ordinator, and the supporting Economic Advisor, given their specific concern with development on an area basis, did provide this element. Project Committee meetings were convened for planning purposes, and discussions would sometimes at least represent an integrated review of proposals. The annual re-plan documents provided a useful focus in this respect, as well as training for local officers in producing area plans.

Other S.R.D.P. Objectives

We might mention briefly two other objectives. The encouragement of local involvement in the development and planning effort was quite heavily stressed among the original aims. The first I.D.S. report, for instance, gave this aspect considerable attention. On the whole the impact of local leaders and other representatives at project meetings appears to have been minimal. Where local involvement appears to be important is not in overall planning, but in consultation over specific items affecting local people directly, for instance, in the location of roads (as in Migori) or at the 'grass roots' level, as when village development committees were organised to assist in group extension efforts.

The S.R.D.P. was seen originally in the Ministry of Finance as a useful device for attracting foreign aid into the rural sector and for diverting aid from the visible type of capital projects towards general and recurrent development expenditure. Although the funds actually secured for S.R.D.P. were not particularly substantial (£2 millions for the period 1971-76), the interest shown by different donor countries in adopting particular areas does show some potential. Similar interest by donor countries in supporting regional planning efforts in Tanzania, where again regions have been 'adopted' by different donors, supports this view.

Conclusions

The impact of the Special Rural Development Programme has not been as great as many would have hoped, and there have been variable results. Nevertheless, some of the successes could be quite important. Shortcomings do not necessarily suggest the S.R.D.P. approach should be abandoned. In fact, these are partly due to the fact that the objectives of S.R.D.P. were not always adhered to, and backing for the programme by the government was not always complete. To a great extent the difficulty was not with the S.R.D.P. approach but with deficiencies which the S.R.D.P. served to expose: for instance, weaknesses in project selection and preparation at the local level, a scarcity of ideas for experimentation and innovation, both locally and centrally, and a strong preference for bureaucracy and routine, which makes the S.R.D.P. approach even more relevant.

Traffic Problems in Nigeria — A Case for Private Enterprise

By F. D. C. WIJESINGHE

Mr. Wijesinghe who was formerly a member of the Ceylon Transport Board is now Economics Officer in the Commonwealth Secretariat.[1]

WITH an area approaching a million sq km and an estimated population of over 55 million, Nigeria is the most highly-populated country in Africa. In area it is three times the size of Ghana and Sierra Leone put together. It possesses a vast network of communications. The Niger, Benue and Cross rivers, the various streams of the Niger delta and the many lagoons are useful waterways for transport. There are 3500 kilometres of railway and 90,000 kilometres of public roads – with marked concentration in the main cash crop areas. There is also a network of air services.

Acute congestion of traffic in Lagos, and especially at the Port, is like a bloodclot clogging the bloodstream of the Nigerian transport system. During the year 1974 oil earnings of at least N 5,700* million have released a flood of government and commercial spending. At the same time the relaxation of exchange control regulations has exerted a direct stimulus on Nigerian trade. Exports have been in the region of 800,000 metric tons per annum during the past few years and imports, which were running at 2.2 million tons, have risen to nearly three million. The railways have failed to cope with port traffic and the need to use road transport has caused acute congestion at the port entrance extending to the wharves and quays and to the city itself.

During the forthcoming Plan 1975–80 period, Lagos is to have six new berths on a third wharf at Apapa. This will increase the number of berths in the Lagos-Apapa complex from 14 to 20. Lagos traffic is, however, growing so fast that it is unlikely that the new berths will be constructed speedily enough to cope with the greatly-increased traffic. The Nigerian Ports Authority is also planning to develop other ports such as Warri and Burutu in the Niger delta and developments are already going ahead at Calabar in the South-East. But Lagos occupies a key position in the commerce of Nigeria and proposals for a second port in the Lagos area are being studied. The Nigerian Ports authority favours a site on Lake Lekki near Epe down the creeks to the east of Lagos†. It would permit traffic for Lagos to be

[1]The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and are not to be taken as necessarily being also the views of the Commonwealth Secretariat.

*The conversion from £.s.d. to Nairas and kobos (1 Naira=100 kobos), January, 1973. At the present rate of exchange (1 Naira=1.2533 £ sterling).

†Since this article was written the Nigerian Government has announced that a new capital is to be built inland and this in due course should add some relief to congestion at Lagos. (Ed.)

separated from traffic for other parts of the country, thus relieving congestion on the capital. It is urgently necessary that the Government should take bold steps to solve the problem of congestion at the port and city of Lagos if the country's transport system is to cope with the great upsurge of economic activity caused by the boom in oil revenues.

The immense and increasing traffic problems of Nigeria provide a challenge to the Federal, State and Local Government Authorities, a challenge too, to the Nigerian entrepreneur to show that private enterprise can play a major part in meeting the transport need of the public. Bruce Dinwiddy in his book "Promoting African Enterprise"‡ suggests that the prospects for the emergence of healthy small enterprises in Africa are dim. The present writer agrees with him that "Governments genuinely seeking to promote African entrepreneurial development probably need to pay close attention to improving the general business environment, in particular by removing unnecessary restriction to business activity, rather than to selecting individual entrepreneurs for special assistance". The writer also agrees with him when he suggests that the health of the Nigerian road transport firms proves that there is real potential in the small African entrepreneur if only he is given the chance of proving himself.

Certainly, Nigerian transport, both in its passenger and its goods haulage sectors owes much to the private contractor. Minibuses, "mammy-waggons" and long-distance taxi services provide efficient services over vast areas of the country. There is also a joint venture between United States (the Greyhound Bus Company) and Nigerian capital. Each of these services is worthy of careful study by the student of transport.

Minibuses

Generally of a Volkswagen station-wagon type, these vehicles provide a most useful service known as "Kia-Kia" or "quick-quick". They are driven by extremely skilful drivers and are easily manoeuvrable in heavy traffic. The writer interviewed the trade union representing these drivers. According to the officials of the Lagos State Amalgamated Minibus Drivers Union there were, in 1971, 2,300 minibuses plying within Lagos State. Every driver is a member of this Union which is capable of taking strong measures against "poachers" and "intruders". Of the 2,300 vehicles, about 300 belong to the Shomulu Branch, 200 to the Itire Branch, 500 to the Apapa Branch and 700 to the Iddo Branch. The Union performs some of the functions of a Licensing Authority, allocating routes among its members. New applicants are charged a fee of N 25 for a lifetime registration with the Union, plus a sum of two shillings per vehicle per day for the use of parking space provided by the Union. Charity buses (decrepit-looking vehicles charging low fares) are considered to be the chief competitors of the minibuses.

It is rather unfortunate that the Minibuses are not permitted into Lagos city proper. As stated earlier, traffic congestion in Lagos is very acute, particularly at the morning and evening peak hours. The City Council has,

‡*Reviewed in the Journal of Administration Overseas, April, 1975* (Ed.).

therefore, imposed a ban on the entry of Minibuses into the City. It would seem that this is done in order to protect the Council's undertaking, the Lagos City Transport Service, from competition by Minibuses, but it is apparent even to a casual observer that there is a large unsatisfied demand for public transport in Lagos. Further, it is evident that minibuses do not take up so much space as conventional buses. In Ibadan there are no restrictions on the entry of minibuses into that city, and a reasonably efficient service of this type of bus is in operation there.

One of the problems facing the Nigerian entrepreneur – particularly the small man – is the difficulty of raising capital. Some of the minibus owners appear to have been obliged to raise funds at exorbitant rates of interest. Others were purchasing cheaper Japanese vehicles. It is not known to what extent, if at all, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board, and the new Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry, are in a position to assist the small entrepreneur, but it is evident that some of the minibus operators are rendering a public service and are deserving of assistance from the State.

Mammy Wagons

The term Mammy Wagons or "Molue" Buses is used to describe the large number of locally-built buses which operate throughout Nigeria, but especially in the southern rural areas. Nigeria has an efficient indigenous bus body building industry which has done well in spite of very limited resources. On the other hand there are on the roads a number of vehicles which have long passed their period of useful service. These vehicles are a danger to life and limb, and the sooner the Government introduces a system of certification by Examiners of Motor Vehicles, the better it will be for all concerned.

The drivers of "Mammy Wagons" have formed a trade union known as the Nigerian Drivers and Allied Transport Workers' Union, which is affiliated to the International Transport Workers' Federation. The Union strongly favours the introduction of a licensing system in order to eliminate what they consider to be "cut-throat" competition. The Union charges its members an "initiation fee" of five shillings plus a monthly subscription of five shillings per vehicle. The Union assists its members in the case of police prosecutions; it gives them superannuation benefits and death benefits, and gives them loans towards the cost of repairing damaged vehicles. The Union runs a fee-levying driving school financed by the International Trade Union Federation. The School not only provides instruction in driving but also runs an adult education section for those of the Union's members who have missed the opportunity of elementary and primary education. The writer was impressed with this example of genuine trade union development which contrasts sharply with trade unions in other developing countries which, to this writer's eye, often seem to be run by designing "outsiders".

Inter-city Taxi Services

For a detailed description of inter-city taxi services, the reader is referred to A. M. Hay's excellent paper "The Importance of Passenger Transport

in Nigeria[2]". These services are best developed in the Eastern States. They also occur to a lesser extent in the West and Mid-West and on a few routes in the North. The drivers work long hours and drive at high speeds. The services pay because the load-factors are high. The favoured vehicle is the Peugeot 404 carrying seven passengers and doing between 5,000 and 8,000 miles a month. Hay refers to a survey carried out in Asaba where 129 taxis were stopped. Of these, 100 were covering a total of 9,218 miles all on round trips, giving 180 miles a day on the average. Fares are generally higher than those of other forms of transport on account of the better-quality service.

The optimum size of undertakings

In a report published in 1961, the Stanford Research Institute stated as follows:-

"In order to lessen the high cost of private automobile passenger transport, and to reduce the traffic density pressure on the road system it is recommended that the Government initiate the development of an efficient inter-urban scheduled bus system. Rather than permitting large numbers of underfinanced small operators to enter the field, only a small number of financially strong and responsible companies (co-operatively organized small owners may be possible as in Ghana) should be issued certificates of public convenience and necessity to operate on prescribed routes." The same view has been taken by numerous Commissions and Committees in other developing countries (eg. Sri Lanka), but when small private owners are compelled to form themselves into large public companies the resulting concerns are soon found to be in the red and begin to clamour for government protection.

This view is based on the hypothesis that economies of scale lie with the larger undertakings. But there does not appear to be empirical evidence in support. For example, Rajinder. K. Koshal writing on "Economies of scale in Bus Transport – Some Indian Experience[3]" uses data pertaining to nationalised road transport undertakings in India, and analyses it using the technique of statistical cost curve fitting through multiple regression analysis. He analyses cost data in the following major categories: (i) cost of personnel, (ii) cost of materials, (iii) overhead costs, (iv) depreciation, and (v) interest on capital. His conclusion is "There is no evidence of economies or diseconomies of scale in the Indian bus transport industry".

Similarly in the United Kingdom, there was a proposal in 1970 to merge a number of municipal undertakings into Regional Passenger Transport Authorities. The reason given for this proposal was that "the efficiency of bus operation is hampered by the small size of the undertakings". M. Lee and I. Steedman have attempted to subject this theory of economies of scale to empirical test. While it is true that their study related to local authority undertakings operating in urban areas in a developed country, unlike the Indian study referred to above, Lee and Steedman's conclusion[4], would

[2] *The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, March, 1969.
[3] *The Journal of Transport and Policy*, January, 1961.
[4] *Ibid.*

seem to contradict the Stanford Research Institute's advice in the Nigerian case. They state, "The weight of our evidence supports the hypothesis of constant returns to scale in municipal bus operation".

Therefore we can conclude that the view that economies of scale lie with the larger undertakings is contradicted both by a study of urban bus operation in a developed country and by a study of mixed urban/rural bus operation in a developing country. The lesson for Nigeria is clear.

The Greyhound Bus Company

The writer interviewed the Managing Director of the Greyhound Bus Company in May, 1971 – when the Company had been only a year in existence. The Company started operations in 1970 with 59 per cent Nigerian and 41 per cent U.S. capital. Its total fleet consisted of twenty vehicles. It operated eight daily services on the two routes between Lagos and Ibadan at a fare of 20 shillings. It ran a daily service between Benin and Lagos and a twice weekly service to Kano – a two-day service of 700 miles.

The writer considers that the Government took a wise step in permitting private capital to provide this service and establish its own market. Unfortunately, the Company started operations without carrying out a proper survey of the roads on which its vehicles were to operate, with the result that in May, 1971, half the buses were out of service with broken axles.

In the writer's opinion, with the then average fare of about three pence per mile and a 50 per cent occupancy rate, the Company could probably break even if its buses ran, on an average, 4,000 miles per month. With better scheduling and the excellent garage facilities now available, this should be well within the bounds of reality.

The Lagos City Transport Service

The Lagos City Transport Service which, in May, 1971, had 375 buses, is the largest single firm in operating buses. In spite of its expatriate General Manager and tolerable garage facilities, this firm had been starved of the capital needed for the purchase of sufficient new vehicles to meet the needs of the most thickly-populated city in Nigeria.

Unrestricted parking of private cars and taxis in Lagos is throttling the passage of public transport in the city. The immediate task of the City Council should be that of overcoming the city's transport deficiency as quickly as possible and with the least expenditure. For this objective it is the bus. despite its inadequacies, that offers the principal hope that mobility can be improved for the majority of urban residents. It is not sufficient to replace the half of the existing bus fleet which has long passed its period of useful service, or even to purchase new buses. Bus operations in Lagos suffer from traffic congestion created by other users of the highway. What is needed is an integrated approach to the highway, traffic control and vehicle components of the bus transport system so that a complete transport service can be provided. It would be fruitless to emphasize equipment alone, without concern for the roadway and traffic engineering.

A proposal for reducing congestion in Lagos

The problem of reducing traffic congestion is one that has been engaging the attention of numerous Consultants, both individuals and firms, especially in the civil engineering field. J. M. Thomson of the London School of Economics in his paper "Methods of Traffic Limitation in Urban Areas" lists three methods of limiting traffic: restraints, such as pricing urban street use and charging motorists more for parking; restrictions, such as the designation of vehicle-free zones; and avoidance, such as designing urban activity systems that reduce the need for vehicle movement.

Wilfred Owen in his I.B.R.D. paper "Automobiles and Cities – Strategies for Developing Countries" pursues the first of these methods:- "Pricing urban road services, banning street parking, and reflecting social costs in the fees paid by motorists could help reduce congestion quickly, with relatively minor investments in buses or other public transport. Pricing policy could act as a rationing device that would reduce the peaks and shift some travel from private cars to public vehicles. One approach would be to use the proceeds of the social costs paid by the motorist to subsidize public transport in recognition of its social benefits. By keeping fares low, or eliminating them altogether it might be possible to minimize the total transportation bill". One of his proposals should be immediately applicable to Lagos: "The simplest remedy appears to be the banning of free parking, which is a burden on the city, and the introduction of parking charges for off-street facilities that reflect both the cost of parking and the costs incurred for peak-hour driving".

Another remedy suggested by Professor Owen in his paper is the banning of automobile traffic in limited areas of the city and the dedication of selected streets to pedestrian traffic. He quotes a recent survey of opinion in Sweden, the most highly-motorized country in Europe, which shows that vehicle-free zones are gaining acceptance among car users. Two-thirds of all persons interviewed considered driving essential to get to work, to the store, or to vacation, but a surprising 77 per cent expressed the view that cars are unnecessary in central city areas. The lesson for Lagos is that there is a growing realization that the big city centre cannot accommodate large numbers of automobiles, that cars are not necessary in such a setting, that supplying good public transport is essential, and that this may mean prohibiting the car from some parts of the city.

Trucks

The trucking industry has, for many years, provided scope for the Nigerian's entrepreneurial abilities. The firms in the industry are, generally, small in size. Entry is free, the capital requirements are not onerous, risks are high and profits are also high.

The writer, however, interviewed some larger firms specializing in the carriage of petroleum products, refrigerated goods, steel and construction equipment. One of the largest firms had 200 lorries with 200 drivers and a similar number of apprentices and mechanics in its well-equipped workshop.

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[4]O.E.C.D. Working Paper No. 3, Paris, 1972.

It had its own mechanical-handling equipment such as cranes and low-loaders for transporting machinery. It was observed that the biggest truck-manufacturers abroad had their agents in Nigeria – mainly in Lagos. They arranged efficient after-sales service and even provided, in some cases, the finance required.

Unlike the situation in some other developing countries, trucks are free to ply wherever they wish carrying whatever goods are available at freely-negotiated rates. But they generally specialize in local or long-distance haulage, particular routes and particular types of commodity. The rates vary with length of haul, weight and type of goods, whether on a contract or not, and the availability or non-availability of back-haul traffic. In 1971 rates varied from three to nearly 10 pence per ton mile. The highest rates were charged in the Mid-Western and Western States and the lowest in the Northern States. The highest rates were for the short hauls (10-20 miles) and the lowest for the long hauls (over 100 miles) but there was no general rule; the rate for Gombe-Yola (164 miles) was seven pence per ton-mile. Rates are lower if there is the possibility of competition from the Railway. Another factor influencing rates is the availability of full or only partial loads. While one can say that haulage rates represent demand and cost factors in general, it is a pity that none of the organs of Government concerned with road haulage have made a systematic study of haulage rates, or their incidence on the cost of the commodities hauled.

Reference has been made earlier in this paper to the serious delays at Apapa Wharf. It is necessary to point out that when a truck is delayed for a week or more at Apapa, the evacuation of produce from the North and West is seriously retarded. Moreover the low utilization of transport capacity increases transport costs. The writer interviewed the port authorities, and found that the delays were not only the result of congestion within the port, but also due to poor documentation procedures, uncontrolled scheduling of arrivals by transporters who fail to synchronize trucking movements with the Nigerian Produce Marketing Corporation, and general lack of co-ordination.

In spite of the above difficulties it was clear that the trucking industry was making a valuable contribution to the economy of Nigeria. There were a large number of small firms each with low overheads and with sufficient flexibility to handle traffic of varied sizes to and from varied destinations. Since entry into the industry is easy there are no monopolies as sometimes exist in developing countries where a licensing system is in existence. It provides valuable experience for small entrepreneurs to acquire management skills and enter a wider arena either in this industry or in some other field. The industry is, in fact, admirably suited to the peculiar needs of Nigeria – widely-scattered farm units, long distances involved, varying population densities, the seasonal nature of agriculture in some areas and year-round production in others.

The question of public control

The question is being asked whether there should be stricter public control over the Nigerian road transport industry – both passenger and

goods. Regulation of an industry by public authorities can take two forms – physical and economic. Physical control is concerned with the registration and licensing of vehicles, the enforcement of technical and safety standards and the testing of drivers. Economic control is concerned with measures seeking to control the quantum and character of the services provided. It includes the issue of Carrier's Permits specifying such matters as the routes to be followed, the commodities to be carried and the charges to be levied.

Drawing on the experience of his own country, Sri Lanka, the writer strongly urges the need for physical control. There is need for the strict examination and certification of both buses and lorries in the interests of the safety of the public. There is need for a strict examination for drivers of both passenger and goods vehicles, and also for the enforcement of the safety regulations which already exist. But he does not recommend the introduction of "economic" controls. At present both passengers and consignors of goods have a wide range of choice of combinations of price and quality before them. At one end of the range are the luxury buses of the Greyhound Bus Company and at the other is travel in trucks. The consumer of the transport service is free to choose the combination of price and quality that suits him.

Some years ago in Sri Lanka there was a rigid licensing system for goods vehicles. The Motor Traffic Act of Ceylon (No. 14 of 1951) closely followed the British Road and Rail Traffic Act of 1933. The Commissioner of Motor Traffic who was the Licensing Authority under the Act held long and protracted inquiries. Every time a new applicant applied to serve a new route or provide a new type of service other hauliers objected, and the most frequent objector was the Ceylon Government Railway. The onus of proof of need was on the applicant. Lawyers and "transport advisers" made their living by appearing on behalf of established hauliers and other objectors. The result was that transport monopolies were created in various parts of the country. The writer recollects a little town called Maturata, the centre of the vegetable-growing area in the hill country of Sri Lanka, where one firm monopolised the carriage of vegetables to Kandy and to the capital, Colombo. However, early in 1959 representations were made by Members of Parliament that monopolistic transport charges were sending up the price of vegetables and other agricultural produce. Fortunately these representations were supported by facts and figures. In the same year the Cabinet decided to suspend, by administrative action, the issue of carriers permits. A lorry, once it had its revenue licence and certificate of fitness, was free to operate in any part of the Island and to carry any type of goods. Very soon the prices of agricultural produce to the consumer in the towns came tumbling down. In spite of several attempts by the Railway Authorities to have the licensing system re-introduced in order to protect its revenues, a competitive system has prevailed in the road haulage field.

When public control of omnibus transport was introduced in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in the early nineteen forties the industry was in a state of chronic excess capacity with competition driving prices below avoidable costs. This, however, is not the case with trucking in Nigeria which is a growing industry whose capital equipment is short-lived. One of the arguments urged in

favour of public control of road haulage is that trucks compete with the Railway which is a public concern, and that railway losses will have to be made good with the taxpayers' money. It has been pointed out that, due to the regressive nature of taxation in Nigeria, the Railway's current deficits are made good through taxes borne largely by the poor. But it is often forgotten that the poor are the greatest beneficiaries of the trucking industry's services. It will be to the advantage of the poor if its charges are reduced through competition. On the other hand if the size and competitiveness of the road haulage industry are restricted through regulation with the object of propping up Railway revenues, the main beneficiaries will probably be the large firms in the large cities who are the biggest patrons of the Railway.

The economist's solution to the Nigerian transport problem would be to free the Railway from its public service obligations and from government control over rates, etc., while at the same time removing any barriers which may exist on entry into the road transport industry. The division of the market would then be left to the forces of competition. In a competitive situation both road hauliers and bus operators would be obliged to base their charges as near to cost as possible. If, as the writer understands, the Nigerian Railway Corporation is now basing its charges on the "cost of service" principle rather than on the "value of service" principle, transport users, by choosing the lowest priced transport service in any circumstances – allowing for differing qualities of service – would be choosing the transport service which was the least costly from the point of view of the community.

Conclusion

This paper seeks to describe the situation in a developing country of the Commonwealth which offers a practical demonstration of the theory that transport services can be provided in such a way that when demand can be met by different forms of carrier, the actual service provided and used is the one which, allowing for differing qualities of service, incurs the least economic cost. Volumes have been written on the need for the co-ordination of transport services but if one looks at transport, particularly in the countries of the Commonwealth, one sees various systems of regulation, generally intended to protect an older or longer established form of transport from competition from a newer one. Here in Nigeria we see both passenger and goods transport in a competitive situation with charges as close to cost as practicable. The user is left to choose that transport service which provides that admixture of price and quality which best meets his needs.

Establishment of Industrial Estates in India: Two Case Studies*

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AN industrial estate is a tract of land which is subdivided and developed according to a comprehensive plan, for the use of a "community" of industrial enterprises. This technique has been examined and recommended, with varying degrees of caution, by a host of experts[1].

In India, it was adopted during the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61), and continues to be one of the programmes of "village and small industries" in the public sector. The proposed outlay on these estates in India's Fifth Five-Year Plan (1974-79) is Rs 249.7M, an increase of nearly one million rupees over the amount provided in the previous Plan[2]. While this item of public expenditure is thus seen to be rising, a sizeable portion of the programme is nonetheless regarded as having been a failure. Out of 10,840 sheds constructed on industrial estates in India, 3,770 – or more than one third – have not been functioning. The Planning Commission considers the number of non-functioning sheds in rural and semi-urban areas particularly, to be "very high"[3]. Hence this programme can, it is hoped, help to highlight some of the problems of development administration in India.

For an intensive, although exploratory, examination of this programme in Punjab, it was decided to use the case study method. Since the programme was in two parts, urban and rural, it was necessary to select one case of each type. An attempt was made to select broadly representative estates. In the selection, help was taken from Punjab Government officials who had an overall view of the programme. The selected estates were in the city of Patiala and the village of Banoor. Data were obtained from (i) relevant reports and records and (ii) interviews with officials, politicians, and businessmen concerned. The narrative and commentary were read in draft by Punjab officials whose views were taken into account when the study was revised.

*These studies were originally made for the Punjab Administrative Reforms Commission. The author is thankful to Dr. J. N. Khosla, member in charge of research, for finances and facilities. He is also thankful to Panjab University for a grant for bringing them up-to-date.

[1]See William Bredo, *Industrial Estates: Tool for Industrialization*, New York, 1960; United Nations, *Establishment of Industrial Estates in Under-developed Countries*, New York, 1961; P. C. Alexander, *Industrial Estates in India*, Bombay, 1963; International Perspective Planning Team, *Development of Small Scale Industries in India: Prospects, Problems and Policies*, New Delhi, 1963.

[2]Government of India, Planning Commission, *Draft Fifth Five Year* Plan 1974-79, Delhi, 1974, Vol. II, p. 164.

[3]*Ibid*, p. 162.

Urban Industrial Estate

The idea of establishing industrial estates in bigger cities and towns was commended by the Small Scale Industries Board of the Government of India (901), in January, 1955. A draft plan was prepared and circulated to State Governments six months later. It was stated in this plan that small-scale industrialists often lacked the finance to purchase suitable buildings or modern machinery. Hence, if they were provided with built-up factory spaces on rental, lease, or a hire-purchase basis, on a planned site containing such service facilities as electricity, gas, water and drainage, they would be able to buy more and better machinery, and would be saved the trouble of acquiring land, getting factory plans passed, arranging power and water connections, and so on.

It was recommended that a commercially constituted landlord in the form of a public company should be entrusted with this programme, as it was considered the tenants would prefer this to dealing with a Government department. Further, it was emphasized that the location of estates was important, and that in selecting sites, factors such as ease of communications, availability of raw materials, vicinity of markets, supply of labour and possibilities of further development with a reasonable capital outlay, should prevail. Accordingly it was suggested that a body of experts should be appointed, either by the company or the Government, to select the sites. It was also suggested that the type of factory buildings should be broadly in consonance with the needs and desires of potential users.

The programme was to be almost wholly financed by the Central Government. In December, 1955, the States were informed about the details of aid available. Twenty year loans would be provided to meet the cost of land and buildings, and loans for layout, roads, power transmission, water supply expenses, etc. would be for thirty years. The loans were to carry interest at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The preliminary cost of planning and designing was to be provided by a free grant. If it was found necessary to subsidize the rent, the Central Government would also provide half the subsidy for five years.

The programme was accepted by the Punjab Government almost without debate, and the sum of Rs. 8.1 million was provided for this purpose in the State's Second Five-Year Plan by the (central) Planning Commission. Action was to begin on 1st April, 1956.

While the decision to accept the aid for the programme was taken, certain of its proposed features were modified. It had been suggested in the draft plan that a public company should be entrusted with it. However, the Government eventually felt it would be better to maintain direct control over the programme and the Department of Industries was given this responsibility. Further, the suggestion that the location should be decided by experts was interpreted to mean that after the council of ministers had chosen the city or town, an *ad hoc* board of officials should inspect the possible sites in it and approve one of them.

Selection of Patiala

Patiala was the chief city[4] (also the headquarters of a district and a division) of a comparatively backward area; it was one of the erstwhile Princely States, and was less developed than surrounding areas which had been under direct British rule. The Maharajah of Patiala having acceded to the Union of India after independence, his State was accordingly merged therein. There followed popular clamour that the former Princely State now deserved special developmental efforts by the new democratic Government, and Members of Parliament, members of the Punjab legislature and influential local members of the ruling party, met ministers of the Punjab Government to make this point.

The argument was convincing. It was felt by ministers that since Patiala was the most important city in this area, location of an industrial estate there would be symbolic of the Government's concern for its people. As the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan was almost gone, provision for the industrial estate at Patiala in the second year (1957-58) was hurriedly made in the budget. The provision amounted to Rs.200,000 for the purchase of land and Rs.882,000 for construction work. Still, politicians and residents of the area kept up their pressure on the Government when it appeared that priority was being given to other cities.

The State government therefore sought early implementation of the project and the district industries officer, Patiala, was asked (mid-August, 1957) to select a suitable site and to prepare detailed proposals for its acquisition immediately. The DIO chose a site adjacent to the existing factory area of Patiala, within two weeks, and asked revenue officials to prepare a map and other necessary documents. However, no further progress could be made that year owing to a misunderstanding that arose in correspondence between the State and Central Government, as a result of which most of the 1957/58 central aid intended for Punjab's industrial estates was diverted to other states.

Not much progress could be made during 1958-59 either, as the Planning Commission reduced the provision for industrial estates in Punjab's annual plan from Rs 3.6 million to Rs 1.5 million. However, a building plan was prepared by the Punjab Public Works Department in September, 1958; this was examined by the Small Industries Service Institute and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, GOI, within a matter of weeks, and revised in May, 1959 at the State level. However, it could no longer be implemented during the remaining period (1959-61) of the Second Five-Year Plan, as there had been an upward revision of estimates for another estate and this ate up the provision earmarked for Patiala. Thus the Second Five-Year Plan period went by!

Renewed public pressure was exerted in 1959. The executive committee of the District Congress Committee, Patiala, unanimously adopted a resolution, in July, which was sent to the Minister of Industries, demanding the early establishment of Patiala City's awaited industrial estate. In May, 1960 the Minister visited Patiala where he was again pressed for action to be taken – early in the Third Five-Year Plan period now being urged.

[4]The population of Patiala city rose from 98,000 in 1951 to over 150,000 in 1971.

Third Five-Year Plan

For the 1961-66 Plan, Punjab's programme of industrial estates had to be drawn up afresh. An early draft prepared in the Department of Industries, proposed that estates should be set up in all towns with a minimum population of 20,000, at the headquarters of all districts, and in a number of other settlement areas.

The total estimated cost of this proposal was Rs 64.2 million. The Director, however, wished to limit the development to one estate at each district headquarters. It appeared to him that a proposal on this basis was more likely to be accepted. In any case they had no economic statistics to go by. None could say whether entrepreneurs would come forward. The district had come to be accepted as a basic administrative unit. As a result, a new proposal was drawn up, based on the director's recommendation and estimated to cost Rs 35.2 million.

Later the director of Industries changed his mind and recommended that the proposal be drawn up on the basis of one estate for every town with a population of 20,000 and over – this was costed at Rs 69 million. The Joint Secretary of the GOI Planning Commission suggested that rather than aiming for estates in every larger town, emphasis should be put on the provision of loans, technical assistance, common facility centres and electricity. The proposal was now revised so as to cost Rs 51.7 million, although the provision was only for the setting up of estates, as these were to be wholly financed by central government.

The number, location and size of industrial estates continued to be discussed between the Director of Industries, the Public Works Department, and senior officials of the Punjab Government. Detailed estimates of works were made and remade, but were rendered useless in the light of broad policy changes. The various estimates between May and July, 1960 came to Rs 32.3M, 40M, 30M and 31M. After discussions between representatives of the Punjab Government and the Planning Commission, the latter finally made provision of Rs 16.5 million for urban estates and Rs eight million for rural estates in Punjab's Third Five-Year Plan. It was proposed to set up seventeen urban industrial estates, one at each district headquarter. Priority was given for the industrial estate in Patiala City to be set up in the first year of the new plan, 1961/62 and provision allowed for Rs 700,000 in the Punjab budget for the construction there of fifteen 'A' type (75' x 20') and twenty 'B' type (50' x 22') sheds.

Selection of Site and Purchase of Land

The District Industries Officer was again asked to select a suitable site and he again recommended the land adjacent to the existing factory area. A sitting board, consisting of the Provincial Town Planner, the Executive Engineer and the District Industries Officer, who were all stationed at Patiala, was now constituted. They met in February, 1961, and after surveying the area, approved a site of approximately 25 acres, suggested earlier by the DIO. The land belonged to the *maharaja* of Patiala, and the DIO was instructed to open negotiations for its purchase. Meantime a site plan,

lay-out and preliminary costings were got ready. To hasten matters the Minister of Industries asked the Commission for Patiala division, to meet the *maharaja* and request him to sell the land. This the latter was not willing to do for less than Rs 4 to 5 per square yard. At a high level meeting in October, presided over by the minister, it was decided that the land was too costly and that other land should be found instead.

Another site was now selected and approved, and it was decided to acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This was done at a cost of Rs 14,158 and on 3rd August, 1962, it was handed over to the Public Works Department – notwithstanding delay caused by urgent flood relief work and a Presidential visit taking precedence at the desks of officials concerned.

Construction

Construction work on the site was started immediately by the contractors, as the chief minister had ordered that it be put in hand in anticipation of administrative approval. At the request of the Punjab Government, technical approval was granted on behalf of the Government of India in March, 1963, while the Punjab Government gave its formal administrative approval in April, 1963.

The construction work having been completed, the estate was handed over to the Industries Department on 27th November, 1963. The cost came to Rs 585,514.

Allotment of Sheds

An advertisment in three English and two vernacular dailies was published inviting applications (with earnest money of Rs 500/- each) for allotment of the Patiala sheds. The District Public Relations Officers also gave wide publicity to the estate. In response to these measures, nineteen applications were received. An allotment committee then met the applicants and pointed out that every allottee would be given a short term (3-6 month) loan of Rs 5,000. It was also agreed provisionally to charge a reduced rent of Rs 175 for an A type shed and Rs 150 for a B type. It was made clear, however, that no commitment could be made on behalf of the Government for the allotment of quotas of controlled raw materials. All the twenty sheds* were allotted to small-scale industrialists. The latter proposed to manufacture such goods as bicycle dynamos, electrical switches and appliances, galvanized pipes, motor spare parts and lens grinding units.

The proposed "schemes" of the allottees were examined by a committee consisting of the Joint Director, Industries, the Technical Expert, Production Engineering, the Technical Expert, Poultry, and the State Geologist. Four of them failed to obtain approval and their sheds were vacated. Six of the others failed to occupy the sheds, while seven of them who did occupy their sheds failed to pay their rents regularly and legal action was taken against them. These "shed-holders" made the following complaints to the Department of Industries:

*Presumably at least one applicant obtained two sheds or late applications were received (Ed.).

1. Controlled raw materials like zinc and coal were not available to them. No quotas had been granted to them. Hence they were not in a position to start manufacturing.
2. The estate was outside the municipal limits of the city. Octroi duty had to be paid every time goods were carried into the city, even for repairs.
3. Repairs to machinery could not be got done on the estate. It was far from the old factory area, hence heavy transport charges were involved in getting repairs carried out.
4. There was no bus service linking the city and the estate. Due to lack of transport facilities, workers preferred jobs in the city and had to be paid higher wages to attract them to the estate.
5. Mail was not properly distributed in the estate. There was no canteen or restaurant.
6. There were cracks in the walls of sheds and the rolling shutters did not work. No arrangement had been made for the maintenance of buildings.
7. Some tenants had not received the water connection.

The allottees demanded that their rent should be reduced to Rs 50, but the department of Industries would not agree and by June, 1965 only three of the sheds had actually started to function.

In July, 1972 the Punjab Government decided to sell the sheds in urban estates on a hire-purchase bøsis. Any arrears of rent were to be paid, with a penal interest, in thirty monthly instalments and the unpaid cost with simple interest in fifteen annual instalments. Fourteen tenants accepted the proposal, although within three years payments from twelve of them fell into arrears which necessitated appropriate official action to be taken against them.

In the course of time, a number of the problems faced by the occupiers of sheds were resolved. Some needed raw materials became available; early in 1975 the municipal boundaries of Patiala were extended and the industrial estate came within the new limits. As more sheds began to function some repair work became possible in the estate itself. A bus service linking the estate with the city was started in August. Arrangements for the maintenance of sheds were also made, and by the end of the year industrial activity was going on in thirteen of the twenty sheds.

Rural Industrial Estate

The programme of establishing rural industrial estates had been started during the Second Five-Year Plan. However, it was felt that their real socio-economic significance had not been appreciated in some quarters. So, when the Third Five-Year Plan was being drawn up, in 1959, the Ministry of Community Development and Co-operation, GOI, drew up and sent to State Directors of Industries, for their comments a detailed draft scheme which set out the principal objectives as follows:

1. to facilitate growth of small industries in the countryside on a diversified basis;

2. to create employment opportunities for the surplus rural population and thereby arrest their exodus to the towns and cities;
3. to provide credit, raw materials and marketing facilities in an integrated manner for quickening the pace of development of rural industries on an organised basis;
4. to provide for the planned location of industries; and
5. to provide for better working conditions in cottage industries.

It was emphasized that special attention should be paid to the location of estates. In this connection the following factors were mentioned:

1. Priority should be given to Community Development blocks* which had done outstanding work in the field of economic development or where an atmosphere had been generated favourable to further rural industrialization;
2. Electricity should be available for industrial purposes;
3. There should be good prospects of getting a sufficient number of small entrepreneurs either by persuading artisans to shift their small units into the estate, or by arranging training facilities for suitable candidates;
4. There should be nearby market facilities, adequate communications and an available water supply for industrial purposes; and
5. Wherever possible, a scheme should be integrated with that of rural housing sponsored jointly by the Ministries of Works, Housing and Supply, and Community Development.

It was suggested that the cost should be low (between Rs 200,000 and 300,000) so as to require low rents. There might be sheds of three sizes, according to need.

In June, 1959, the comments of all the departments concerned were invited.

The Chief Engineer (Public Health), PWD, expressed the view that it might not be necessary to establish new estates as suitable sheds might already be available. In his opinion more important than constructing sheds was the provision of training facilities for industrial workers, the supply of equipment on a hire-purchase basis, granting loans, providing guidance for improving the quality of local products and help over marketing. The Chief Engineer (Buildings and Roads) PWD, suggested that it would be better to start at a few potential places on a very small scale and to expand later. The Chief Engineer, State Electricity Board, pointed out that Punjab had an acute shortage of power, and that it was important to know how much total power would be required year-wise before any commitment could be made.

Notwithstanding all these comments a decision was reached in September, 1959, that the Punjab should go ahead with its rural estates programme practically as it had been formulated by GOI who would be providing the

Sub-divisions of a district (Ed.).

finance anyway. Certain suggestions were made however relating to the provision of residential accommodation for workers, and of equipment on a hire-purchase basis and the opening of raw-material depots. The Estates were to be sited in villages with a population of 2-5,000 and every Block Development Officer in Punjab was instructed to propose a village, bearing in mind the following considerations:-

1. Availability of electricity, water, transport and communication facilities;
2. Existence of a ready market, raw materials and special skills in nearby villages; and
3. Priority to be given to a backward village.

After a long drawn out exercise for preparing the estimates at State level, the Planning Commission allocated Rs eight million for rural estates in Punjab's Third Five-Year Plan. The physical target was seventy-two rural estates.

Selection of Banoor

While the Plan was being drawn up, political leaders were busy ensuring that their constituencies received a fair share of developmental resources. The member of the Legislative Assembly from the constituency in which Banoor lay, was a powerful member of the ruling party who regarded Banoor as a place of historic interest which should be given due recognition. He took the matter up with senior State ministers and impressed upon them the importance and needs of this particular village which had a population of nearly 3,500 and was situated on a highway, some sixteen miles from the State capital. Electricity was available. It was proposed to develop a ring of rural industrial estates around the capital which could be made to include Banoor. A strong point made by the MLA was that some of the land was lying barren and it might be obtainable at a nominal price. These efforts in favour of Banoor bore fruit and its proposed estate was included in the programme for the first year of the Third Five-Year Plan, and the State budget.

Selection of Site and Purchase of Land

The District Industries Officer was asked in February, 1961, to select two or three alternative sites for an industrial estate in the village, but the one selected belonged to the District Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Board, who refused to sell it. Another site was then chosen on land belonging to the Government, and this was duly approved by the various Departments concerned.

However, when it was learned that the government land had already been allotted for another purpose, a search was made for yet another site. The Collector favoured the original site belonging to the Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Board, and the land was acquired, after the Board had been reminded of the great importance attached by the chief minister (who was its chairman) to the programme of rural industrialisation.

Construction

Provision was made for ten sheds, tenders for their construction were invited in August 1962, and the estate was ready in August 1964, at a cost of Rs 196,263. Meantime, applications for the sheds had been invited, and it was announced that rents would be subsidised on a sliding scale—50 per cent in the first year, the subsidy being reduced by 10 per cent in each subsequent year. However, not a single application was received up to the closing date in February 1964. Apparently there was a dearth of industrial potential and of entrepreneurs in the rural areas, and among incentives then proposed in order to attract rural industrialists were:

i. subsidizing the rents;
ii. allotment of quotas of controlled raw materials;
iii. exemption from payment of purchase tax, sales tax and professional tax;
iv. price preference for purchase of the products by the Government;
v. supply of electricity at a subsidized rate, to the extent of 50 per cent; and
vi. grant of a quota of ancillary raw materials.

It was also suggested that instead of constructing sheds, loans under the State Aid to Industries Act should be made available for the purchase of plots of land. Further, a list of "self-reliant" industries should be drawn up for the guidance of potential entrepreneurs.

As time passed, applications for the allotment of sheds began to trickle in and one by one all the sheds were allocated. The occupiers however complained of difficulties in getting power connections, the distance from the rail head, lack of marketing facilities and shortage of raw materials. There were those who failed to occupy their sheds, new allotments were made.

At the close of 1975, three of the ten sheds had been allotted for the manufacture of agricultural implements, stationery, and tents. However, industrial activity had started in none.

Conclusion

These cases indicate the tragedy of some developmental efforts. While every care was apparently taken by the authorities concerned the disappointing result was that after eleven years not one industry was actually functioning in the rural estate and a third of the sheds on the urban estate remained empty.

One of the problems that emerges relates to centre-state relations. The programme of industrial estates was adopted by the Punjab Government without examining whether it suited this state from the economic point of view. It might be that while the establishment of industrial estates would best help the growth of small industries in other states programmes such as those of providing loans or technical assistance or marketing facilities would be more useful in Punjab. This possibility was not considered at the state level; as this programme was to be financed by the Central Government, it seems to have been accepted without question.

Another interesting aspect of centre-state relations is the role of the state Government in national planning. We find Punjab officials groping in the dark, making and remaking detailed estimates of the five year programme, amounting to a much larger total than was ultimately made available by the Planning Commission. This indicates, inter alia, too great a dependence of the State on the Centre.

The role of the politician looms large in these stories. It had been stipulated in the original plan that the selection of locations would be made by experts. However, at the time of implementation the cities and villages were selected by the council of ministers, who were pressured by local interest groups and politicians. It can be argued that the local politician was truly interested in the economic development of his area. However, the fact remains that he was not interested in the relative economic merits of the various possible locations; his interest lay solely in his constituency. The conflict between political and economic considerations here is obvious.

Even at the second stage of selecting the specific site in the city or village, the decision was really taken at or near the political level. An *ad hoc* board of so-called experts (consisting of engineers and generalist officers of the Department of Industries) was brought in only nominally to give its "approval". Thus we note that at Patiala, the piece of land first selected was adjacent to the existing factory area, but was considered to be too costly at a meeting presided over by the minister. The land finally selected was initially cheap. However, its distance from the city and the existing factory area resulted in greater costs for tenants. An economist might have considered this aspect of the problem; the minister and his advisers apparently did not.

An important early political decision was to run the programme departmentally instead of setting up a public company, because the Government wanted to have "direct" control over the programme. While no one knows what would have happened if the company had been set up, we do know that the programme, as implemented, suffered from several inadequacies. No cost benefit analysis was made—in particular no studies of economic feasibility of the projects were made; no effort was made to consult potential entrepreneurs in planning and designing the sheds; and the rent turned out to be too high. A "commercially constituted landlord", as originally proposed, might have done better.

Throughout these two studies, one meets old and cumbersome departmental structures and procedures; there are communication gaps all along. It appears that the administrative machine, with its built in checks, was never intended for the kind of job it was being asked to do in establishing industrial estates. It was unable to adjust to new situations and not perhaps unexpectedly it failed rather sadly to fulfil its new task.

The Public Administration in Mauritius

By MARTIN MINOGUE

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In Mauritius, as in so many less developed countries, the effectiveness of the public service is a factor crucial to the realisation of plans for social and economic progress. This article provides a brief account of the historical development of the Mauritian public service and of the principal problems which face this public service at the present time. It is a case-history which encapsulates experience elsewhere in the developing areas.

Mauritius has a system of government which, in its basic forms, is derived from the "Whitehall-Westminster" model peculiar to Britain. It is a system which imposed upon the dependent territory the Crown Colony model and which was so characteristic of British colonial government. Under this system, Mauritian politicians were compelled to work through the Crown Colony institutions: a Legislative Council and an Executive Council, increasingly inter-related and bound together under a system of representative and responsible government.

A central feature of this relationship was the ministerial system, introduced in Mauritius in successive stages: 1951 when Liaison Officers were introduced; 1957, when the unofficial members of the Executive Council elected from the Legislative Council were styled Ministers and made collectively responsible for their acts; 1964, when the Executive Council became a Council of Ministers with the leader of the majority party as Premier; and 1967, when the Premier became a Prime Minister, presiding over the Council of Ministers.

This "responsible" model of Ministerial government incorporates assumptions about the relationships between Ministers and officials. The central assumption is that Ministers are responsible to the legislature for all executive acts; civil servants, therefore, are not responsible, and take a neutral, non-partisan role in advising Ministers. They hold permanent positions, whereas Ministers are impermanent. They are responsible to Ministers for policy advice and policy implementation; but in no sense are they accountable to the Legislature. This is the formal model of the civil service in Mauritius. But it is a model which was reached only by stages carefully controlled by the colonial administration; and it is also a model which does not always correspond with Mauritian political realities.

Although, contrary to the practice in many African countries, Mauritians were admitted at an early stage to posts in the administrative cadres, the crucial senior positions were invariably held by British expatriate officials. In an administrative sense, this often meant "too many clerks and too few

managers"[1]. In the political sense, it meant that only when Mauritian politicians acquired Ministerial responsibilities was there a corresponding movement to recruit Mauritians to the higher levels of the administration; there was a marked relationship between Mauritian political advance and "Mauritianisation" of the bureaucracy.

As the earlier British notions of gradual advance towards self-government began to be displaced by an acceptance of the principle that political power must, without undue delay, be transferred to local politicians, there came a realisation that political change had outrun administrative growth. The highly centralised administrative machinery which had served colonial-style administrations would not serve the requirements of the emerging political system. And so, with political changes, came attempts to improve the administrative machine upon which the new leadership would have to rely.

The Meacock Report, 1955[2]

These attempts, in Mauritius, can be located initially in the mid nineteen-fifties. In 1955, a British Organisation and Methods Adviser, Meacock, investigated the machinery of central government in Mauritius. His report, which in the first paragraph declares that "the Mauritius Civil Service shows most of the classic faults of bureaucracy", is an indictment not only of the ineffectiveness of the island's colonial bureaucracy, but clear evidence of the lack of preparedness of this bureaucracy for the political changes about to transform its function. The faults which are mentioned then still, in the Mauritius of the 1970s, have a familiar ring: "delay", "poor integration at the intermediate supervisory levels", "inefficiency resides not so much in the methods . . . as in the way they are operated".

The remedies have also, by the 1970s, become familiar through repetition: "early training", "good supervision and leadership", "proper disciplinary standards", "comprehensive and up-to-date instruction manuals", "the setting of time-schedules", "delegation", "improving liaison"; ultimately, "the basic problem . . . is a personnel problem". The key solution is said to be in providing qualified and trained staff in sufficient numbers. There is an acknowledgement in Meacock, if a surprisingly hesitant one, that the demands made upon the government machine are greater than in the past, and that there may be a "failure of the Mauritius Civil Service to adapt itself to present day conditions . . . not so much a question of actual deterioration as of a failure to improve".

The Newton Report, 1957[3]

Meacock's analysis was clear enough, but his final qualification that "the best results will be achieved if not too much is attempted all at once" was an invitation to be ignored. There is little evidence that the invitation was

[1]Mauritian Legislative Council, Sessional Paper No. 7 of 1955, p. 2. *The Meacock Report on Organisation and Methods.*

[2]Mauritius Legislative Council; *Sessional Paper No. 7 of 1955:* Report of the Organisation and Methods Adviser.

[3]Report of a Working Party to review the Structure, Operation, and System of Recruitment of the Public Service (Port Louis, 1957).

spurned; and in 1957 a further examination of the structure and operation of the public service, by a Working Party under the chairmanship of the Colonial Secretary, Robert Newton, conceived that the principal objective was "to devise a pattern for an improved, modernised Public Service", incorporating "the provision of a suitably qualified personnel (and) the provision of adequate training".

The Newton Report roundly condemned the existing Public Service as "a relic of an earlier age"; a system which was "virtually unworkable". The Report recommended that the existing system should be replaced by what its members knew best; the British model of a tripartite division into Administrative, Executive, and Clerical Classes, with British methods of competitive recruitment on the basis of merit. The Report set out succinctly the functions and structure of these classes. Mauritius was to be provided with "the career open to the talents which the country needs", and an administrative structure which could no longer be described as "lagging behind the stages reached in constitutional, economic and cultural development". Less happily, the Report was of the opinion that efficient performance would depend "primarily on intelligence and practical experience", yet another invitation to avoid fundamental action over working methods, and over training, which would chiefly consist of "learning . . . work under the guidance of senior officers".

The Newton Report is the founding father of the present-day Mauritian Public Service; and was designed to fit in appropriately with the ministerial system to be introduced during the same period.

Newton circulated to the Mauritian administration, a memorandum which is an illuminating account of the intended operation of the Ministerial system, particularly as it affected relations between civil servants and politicians[4]. He made explicit reference to Herbert Morrison's analysis of these relations,[5] so underwriting the essentially British notion of a non-partisan and objective civil service. But Mauritian soil scarcely favoured such a tender growth, either then or now: and Newton himself drew attention to the (implied) characteristics of the Mauritian bureaucracy which would militate against successful operation of the Ministerial system. "Failure to show courtesy to members of the public, delay in the handling of correspondence, mistakes in routine work at any level, can embarrass a Minister who is responsible to the Legislature . . . they can also discredit the more advanced system of democratic government which is now being introduced. Personal advantage, differences of class, community, and religion, have no relevance to a good Public Service, and must be firmly set aside".[6]

The Meade Report, 1961[7]

Because of the implementation of the Newton Report, the British economist J. E. Meade, in his examination of the economic and social structure of

[4]Secretariat Circular No. 8 of 1957.
[5]Herbert Morrison, *Government and Parliament* (1st edn. 1956).
[6]Secretariat Circular No. 8 of 1957.
[7]MLA Sessional Paper No. 7 of 1961: the Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius.

Mauritius'[8] was able to say that "as Mauritius has progressed towards a parliamentary and cabinet system on the lines of the United Kingdom, it has adopted a similar administrative organisation". Meade found defects in this revised system, in particular the uneasy relationships within it between generalist administrators and technical specialists. There was "a noticeable lack of administrative experience"; but (contrary to previous Reports) there was "over-staffing". Meade identified a need to obtain better departmental co-ordination, and recommended "a thorough review of present methods and procedures and a reorganisation of staff training". Significantly, Meade echoed Newton in pointing to a problem not usually touched on in official reports: "those in positions of authority should learn to disregard family, communal, and political ties in the exercise of their political and administrative duties". Unfortunately, this pious definition of bureaucratic duty was unbuttressed by any practical suggestions as to how Mauritian officials should cope with the consequences of disregarding family, communal and political ties, a failing which in itself reflects an uncritical acceptance of the suitability for Mauritius of Western political institutions. Indeed, Meade proposed to Anglicise Mauritian officials even more completely, through a system of interchange of British and Mauritian public service officers. This suggestion (probably no simple one to have implemented), like so many others in the Meade Report, was ignored.

The Gardner Brown Report, 1967[9]

With the approach of independence, a further look at the internal structure of the Mauritian civil service was thought expedient. This inspection centred on the question of salaries and conditions of service, but the terms of reference referred to "the need to sustain an efficient Public Service", with particular regard to "the essential numbers of appropriately qualified . . . personnel" and the qualifications necessary "in the light of changing requirements and educational standards".

The Report emphasised the proliferation of overlapping functions and pay-scales, which made for an irrational, inefficient administrative structure, and for a dissatisfied civil service. In its own turn irrational, the Report drew back from any fundamental re-assessment of the administrative system: "the best system is that which has been found to work well: change for the sake of change is to be avoided". There was also a highly pertinent discussion of "the need for an efficient service" which concluded that there was no shortage of able Mauritians, but that there were problems in attracting them to the public service, particularly where emigration acted as a drain on local resources. The Report also referred to the conditions under which Mauritians are required to work—"conditions which seem to them to deny them the chance to practice their craft and to give of their best". In addition, the Report criticised an unduly rigid preoccupation with formal academic qualifications which might not always be relevant to the requirements of the posts involved.

[8]Commissioned by the Government of Mauritius; the Mauritius Labour Party had close links with the British Labour Party and turned to British Labour Party advisers (James Meade and Richard Titmuss) for advice on economic and social questions.

[9]Report of the Salaries Commissioner (Mr. Gardner-Brown), 1967.

The Report presented proposals for an improved internal organisation, a more effective recruitment process, and a more rational salary structure. Particular emphasis was laid on the need to rationalise the Administrative Class system which "has stuck out like a sore thumb", so that there should be more uniform qualifications for entry, and rewards for position, as between generalist and specialist cadres. The proposals in relation to the Executive and Clerical Classes were designed primarily to avoid the charge that "the Executive Class is no more than an extension of a clerical career", and so "to re-assert the distinction which should clearly be seen to exist". The technical classes were of great potential importance, and should be rationalised and better-paid so as to overcome an unhealthy "bias . . . in favour of attracting high-quality school leavers to the 'white collar' jobs".

The Gardner-Brown Report dealt with other 'governmental' categories, the most significant of these being the Police. Paragraph 100 of the Report attempted to define and emphasise the crucial role of the Police as an executive arm of government: "dissatisfaction in any other branch of government will, and does, lead to public inconvenience and inefficiency, and waste of time and money in the conduct of government business, but I know of nowhere where a loss of standards – and dissatisfaction and loss of morale inevitably breed loss of standards – can lead so quickly to a complete breakdown in the maintenance of law and order, and from that to a breakdown in government."

After 1967

Since 1967, there has been no further investigation of the structure and functioning of the central system of administration,[10] at least in any formal sense. But the whole concept of the public service as it had developed under the colonial system is enshrined in the 1968 Independence Constitution. Section 68 allocates the direction of government departments between Ministers (who have "general direction and control") and senior civil servants (whose responsibility is "supervision"). Section 88 provides for a Public Service Commission with powers of appointment, removal, and disciplinary control.[11] Certain senior official appointments are vested in other Commissions, or rest effectively with the Prime Minister, though the Prime Minister often has to consult other interested parties e.g. the Leader of the Opposition. The Constitution also introduced an Ombudsman, but this device to investigate and check maladministration has proved wholly ineffective so far.

It is clear that the whole machinery of government, and the structure and operation of the public service, are badly in need of an overhaul; it is still the case that Mauritius exemplifies the classic faults of bureaucracy, and nowhere more so than in the tendency to avoid the difficult business of administrative reform. Mauritians themselves acknowledge that such reform is a *sine qua non* in a developmental economy.

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[10]Another Salaries Commissioner, Mr. Sidgwick, reported in 1973, but his principal recommendations were for substantial salary increases in the public service.

[11]The Public Service Commission in fact began as an advisory body in 1955 and became executive in 1967.

The Mauritius Four Year Plan emphasises that "efficient implementation is crucial to the successful achievement of planned objectives", and that this requires an "elaborate organisational system (and) a development-oriented administration"[12]. At the same time, the Plan admits that there is a fundamental problem "of making the whole machinery of Government a more effective instrument of development policy . . . the Civil Service is not at present adequately equipped to implement the plan". There must be "changes both in administrative organisation and methods and in administrative attitudes"; in sum, "fundamental reform is needed".

To achieve this, the Plan proposes a "high-level review" of the Civil Service by a "committee consisting of top members of the Service assisted by top-ranking international experts. The Committee according to the Plan will be given supreme Government support, freedom of movement, and adequate time", and "will make recommendations on how to bring about development orientation in Government Machinery". Meanwhile, there will be a review of organisation and methods, and an intensification of training.

It would appear, therefore, the Plan makes no practical proposals for dealing with what it admits to be a crucial problem, but locates responsibility for such proposals elsewhere. Since the publication of the Plan, progress has been piecemeal. In the field of public service training, the Centre for Public Administration and Local Government, in the School of Administration at the University of Mauritius, has developed a full programme of training for officers at all levels of the public service, for officers in local government, and to a more limited extent, for staffs of parastatal bodies[13]. Courses are specifically designed to provide a practical orientation, while at the same time, providing officials with a thorough grasp of crucial 'developmental' studies in economic, administration, sociology and quantitative methods.

Full-time 'generalist' courses of one year are provided for senior administrative officers; a full-time professional training programme with a duration of two to five years is provided for senior officers with financial and accounting responsibilities; full-time courses of ten weeks' duration are provided for executive and clerical classes; and part-time release courses are to be provided for lower-level routine training, at the 'departmental' level.

The problem with training lies, not in the provision of courses, but in relating training to the real world in which the government officer operates. For essentially, training attempts to provide an example of 'perfectible' administration, while the trainees return to an imperfect administrative system. No training programme can succeed unless its objectives are related to attempts to achieve a more perfect administrative system; in other words, administrative training and administrative reform go hand in hand, and cannot succeed in isolation from each other. This lesson has yet to be learned

[12] Four-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1971–1975, Vol. I, Chapter VI, on Implementation.

[13] This Public Service Training Programme has been the principal fruit of an I.U.C.-sponsored tripartite link between the University of Mauritius, The Department of Administrative Studies in the University of Manchester, and the Institute of Local Government Studies at the University of Birmingham.

in Mauritius, and indeed in many other countries, including some of those which provide support for public service training overseas.

The "high-level review" has still not taken place, despite the urgency accorded to it four years ago by the Plan. In the field of Organisation and Methods, an O & M Adviser was appointed to the Government of Mauritius in 1970, and a Management Services Unit was brought into operation (so realising, after a period of ten years, a proposal in the Meade Report, which itself echoed a proposal in the 1955 Meacock Report!) But there is, as yet, little evidence of more than minor changes in the organisation and methods of Mauritian administration. International organisations, notably the World Bank, are deeply involved in Mauritian projects, but have failed (either through inertia or diplomatic nicety) to make much impact on the administrative system which is crucial to the successful operation of the projects they support. Bilateral aid programmes have also faltered at the same hurdle.

In short, administrative organisation and attitudes remain largely unchanged, and the Civil Service continues to be inadequately organised and equipped to implement the social and economic changes promised in the Plan. Evidence has emerged of serious delays over projects implementation, the central core of the Plan[14]. It is clear that reform of the public administration is vital and urgent; and that further delay will gravely handicap the ability of the Mauritian Government to realise the social and economic objectives it has set itself to achieve.

[14]Notably in a three-day Seminar held at the University of Mauritius from 22nd–24th March, 1973, in which senior members of the public service, local authorities, and parastatal bodies discussed the problems of plan implementation.

Quarterly Notes

NEW GUINEA – *Crime Prevention Seminar*

Nearly all the developing countries, comprising more than three quarters of the world's population, face problems of increasing crime. This statement was made by Professor Marshall B. Clinard from the University of Wisconsin, to the ninety-two participants in the five-day seminar on "Crime Prevention in Developing Areas", held in July 1975, in Port Moresby, and jointly run by the Australian Institute of Criminology and the Department of Law of Papua – New Guinea.

The assembled magistrates, senior police officers, welfare officers, representatives of government departments and other organisations, listened to suggestions made by the Professor for ways of minimising the impact of crime associated with development. He urged controls on the size of cities, and the provision of adequate street lighting, security systems, and police protection.

Mr. William Clifford, Director of the Australian Institute of Criminology and previously with the United Nations, stressed the role of child care and education in crime prevention, and discussed the relationship between customary and imported law. He suggested that the penalty of restitution was well suited to the traditions of Papua-New Guinea, and urged that consideration be given to establishing a probation service.

Professor Arturo Rios of the Catholic University of Brazil, gave two lectures on the structure of squatter settlements in Brazil. In his opinion, the barrios developed their own means of social control, and therefore, did not necessarily lead to high crime rates. He went on to outline a number of techniques that made positive use of settlements once they had been established.

The acting Chief Minister of Papua-New Guinea, Sir Maori Kiki, in his opening address, had urged the participants to formulate constructive suggestions for crime prevention. Some of the recommendations of the discussion groups were as follows: a police juvenile squad should be established; police activity should include general community development; street lighting must be improved; a Standing Commission on Crime should be established; anti-corruption laws should be introduced and rigorously enforced; the establishment of a National Youth Service should be considered.

Source: Australian Institute of Criminology Newsletter No. 1
September, 1975

UNITED NATIONS – *U.N.I.D.O.*

The United Nations Industrial Development Organization which, for 1976–77, has a budget of $45,167,000, underwent a substantial change on

1 January 1976, "aimed at helping it to meet the challenge of the new tasks arising from the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Co-operation, and from the seventh special session of the UN General Assembly".

Seven programmes are now contained within the new structure, compared with ten, previously; three programmes – policy-making organs, executive direction and management, and administrative services, have been carried over.

The Lima Declaration called for the establishment of an industrial development fund, and Dr. Khane, Executive Director of UNIDO, has explained that the restructuring was designed to make UNIDO "more action-orientated, and to accommodate the new tasks assigned to it in the sphere of over-all responsibility for the formulation of global concepts in matters relating to industrial developments".

Source: UNIDO Newsletter No. 93

INDIA – *Urban Improvements*

The Rajasthan Government has started a large-scale campaign in order to make the City of Jaipur more beautiful: stalls and hoardings are to be removed and the famous Ram Niwas Garden freed from all shops.

A second step is to persuade citizens that all houses in the walled city should have pink walls. In the days of princely rule, the outer walls of houses had to be pink, which caused Jaipur to be known all over the World as the Pink City.

Pursuing their efforts to make the entire city pink coloured, the department of archaeology and museums has decided to give a face-lift to the famous Hawa Mahal – the Palace of Winds – which was in danger of collapse. The pink shade and the floral motifs and designs in white will be restored.

Source: IULA Newsletter

GUINEA – *The Military Civilian Integration*

While no details of the scheme itself were given, President Sekou Touré of Guinea has announced that in future, ranks in the military and other branches of the public service will be interchangeable. According to the President, a university professor could request a transfer to the army and would be given a rank equivalent to his civilian status. Similarly, a sergeant could apply for a civil service post and be appointed to a grade suitable to his military seniority. This announcement represents a further attempt on the part of the Guinea authorities to integrate the armed forces fully into the life of their country.

Source: *West Africa*

Book Reviews

The Central Executive, by S. S. KHERA; *Orient Longman, New Delhi*, 1975; pp. 334 incl. index; Rs. 28.00.

It was extremely bad luck for Mr. Khera that his book went to the Press in June 1975 just when a judge of the Allahabad High Court declared Mrs. Gandhi's election to parliament invalid and disqualified her from holding office for six years. Mr. Khera drew the conclusion that the "Rule of Law" had been validated in India, and noted that democracy would be safeguarded by 'submission to the verdicts of the courts of law and of the people'. Mrs. Gandhi had other ideas, and by the time this book was published she had fundamentally changed the rules of governance in India: perhaps for ever.

It is clear from the text that Mr. Khera was totally unprepared for the new situation. His book abounds with aphorisms such as 'No government can be carried on without the participation of the people' or 'A free press, untrammelled by undue constraints . . . is a *sine qua non* of a free society': these look pretty irrelevant now. Yet the whole thrust of the book is directed to the supreme power exercised by the prime minister in India, and directed to emphasising how Mrs. Gandhi has consolidated and enlarged this power. Clearly, Mr. Khera understood very well what was going on, and yet felt constrained to produce a model of Indian government based upon what he conceived to be the classical model of British government.

In fairness one must add that most exponents of the British system are content to describe a model which no longer exists, and perhaps never did. Britain in 1976 has a government elected by 33 per cent of the vote and 25 per cent of the electorate. The governing party is split over almost every major policy issue, and was compelled to resort to the unprecedented device of a referendum to resolve its own irreconcilable differences over British membership of the EEC. A theorist might suppose that the British prime minister lives from day to day under the threat of demission by party, parliament or people. Yet never has a British prime minister enjoyed so much power, analogous to that of an American president! Political scientists who were not brainwashed by all the conventional wisdom might immediately revise our concept of the role of parliament and of parliamentary elections. But of course they do not do so. Hence, we should not feel too superior about Mr. Khera's inability to distinguish political myth from reality.

In examining the different branches of government he begins by tracing out historical origins and by making comparisons with Western – usually British – practice. There have been so many descriptions of the judiciary, the civil service, etc., that these parts of the book will have little value, except to the reader who wants a simple, rather formal introduction to institutions of government. Naturally, one turns with greatest interest to the chapter on the Cabinet Secretariat, remembering that the author was Cabinet

Secretary during the crucial period of Nehru's final decline, the brief interlude of Lal Bahadur Sastri, and the advent of Mrs. Gandhi. However, Mr. Khera's tact and discretion overcome any inclination to reveal what happened behind the scenes. He mentions that during intervals between old and new premiers the President 'ensured the continuity of the Council of Ministers . . . In this series of events, the Cabinet Secretary . . . provided the necessary services for the President to assist him in dealing with a situation'. There he stops. When he wants to describe how the Cabinet functions in India he interpolates a description of a British Cabinet meeting given by Patrick Gordon-Walker. This ultra-reticence rather limits the usefulness of the book, once the author moves from formal descriptions of institutions and procedures.

The best sections are those which indicate how the authority of the prime minister has expanded. Although India has a federal, or quasi-federal constitution, he shows how Mrs. Gandhi has enlarged the centre's power to intervene, often superseding recalcitrant state premiers on grounds 'which fail to convince' the constitutionalist. She has also succeeded in ensuring that with her own nominee as president there can be no question of a presidential veto, as earlier writers often envisaged. Subject only to "Dressing up" the Cabinet to look as if it represents different regions and communities, the prime minister "represents the whole of the executive government": she can hire and fire her ministers as she decides.

What of the influence of the civil servants, of which so much has been made by many writers? Mr. Khera demonstrates that their only real sanction is their ability to hang on to their place in the hierarchy. Those who are ambitious go along with the political directives. Those who have scruples 'play safe': "So long as they play safe, do as little as possible, take no risks, display no initiative, they are safe enough in the security of their employment, even if some of the plums of office are denied them". The individuality and non-conformity which marked the old I.C.S. is missing in the I.A.S. Either an official goes along with the politicians or else he marks time.

Mrs. Gandhi has learned to pick out the officials who will be active agents for her purposes, discarding those who would thwart her. Mr. Khera provides a number of case-studies – perhaps the account of India's emergence as a Nuclear Power is the most instructive – which demonstrate how much more determined, and purposive she has proved to be than her father. In a comparison between prime ministers he observes that she is "even braver and certainly bolder in the face of opposition than Nehru was. She responds to any attack so fiercely as to take her attackers off balance". Strange, that knowing his subject so intimately, Mr. Khera should not have anticipated her response to a judicial ouster. Perhaps the lesson for any Third World reader is that the old rule still governs:

> The good old rule, the simple plan,
> That they may take who have the power,
> And they may keep who can.

HUGH TINKER

The Economics of Non-formal Education Resources, Costs & Benefits, by MANZOOR AHMED. *Praeger, New York*; pp. 122; $12.50.

This is another welcome contribution to the growing literature of non-formal education from a member of the team of the International Council for Educational Development that produced "Attacking Rural Poverty". It is especially welcome because it plunges courageously into the jungle of educational economics.

The author is well aware of the difficulties: the variety of inputs; the varying costs of these inputs, so that the same amount of spending does not mean the same amount of educational service"; the varying efficiency and effectiveness of programmes so that "the same amount of spending . . . . does not represent the same . . . learning achievements or benefits". And when it comes to evaluating benefits the difficulties are self-evident. Are we not still awaiting the evaluation of Unesco's experimental work-oriented literacy programme, which for ten years and at great cost has attempted to measure the effects of functional literacy on development?

Dr Manzoor Ahmed wisely limits his aims: "not to produce a definitive technique of economic analysis of non-formal education" but rather to " . . . indicate an approach to economic questions that will be helpful to planners and managers of education in solving operational problems". The relation of education to economic growth is not he adds, within the scope of his book.

An extensive chapter is devoted to resources – financial and physical, actual and potential – though with full recognition of the problems of estimating the potential resources for non-formal education Another chapter deals with costs, cites a range of "cost-saving features" from programmes in a number of countries and endeavours, though with little conviction, to compare costs of formal and non-formal education. Noting the trend of ever-rising educational costs", the author refers to the widely held belief that use of new media and self-instructional methods" offers a prospect of reversing this trend. In the subsequent chapter in "benefits and cost effectiveness" evidence is adduced from programmes in many countries. Yet one cannot but agree with the author's statement that "we are confronted with a vast vista of prospects and potentialities but comparatively little hard evidence extracted from real experience". Is there any evidence that 'mass media' or 'multi-media' programmes are achieving the hoped for break-through? With the possible exception of the Accion Cultural Popular Programme in Columbia and its imitators in 16 Latin American Countries – seemingly very little. Indeed there are enormous difficulties both in producing software and maintaining hardware to bring long-distance education programmes to developing rural areas and, as Dr. Ahmed suggests, "the advantages of the media approach . . . may not be as great as they appeared at first sight".

In his balanced discussion of the economics of non-formal education one element was ignored, as it was in 'Attacking Rural Poverty' – namely the fact that the people of the world speak three or four thousand languages. No-one knows exactly how many – or how many of them have no literature or even no accepted alphabet. Surely this is a crucial factor in the cost-effectiveness

of education – especially non-formal education, when one considers the multiplication of time and effort needed to educate a person – especially a 'non-captive' adult – in a language that is not his mother tongue, or alternatively the cost of transposing education facilities – and media programmes – into a multitude of languages.

Dr. Ahmed closes with these words, "only by applying the cost-effectiveness tool to programmes . . . and by refining it progressively, can its usefulness in the tasks of planning and managing education be realized". Let us hope that he will follow up his interesting survey of the economics of non-formal education with an operational manual on how to do this.

JOHN BOWERS

Mwea – An Irrigated Rice Settlement in Kenya, ROBERT CHAMBERS and JON MORIS (Eds); *Africa-Studien Nr.* 83; appendices, plates, bibliography, map; pp. 524.

This is a volume of great significance for all those interested in Rural Development in situations where agricultural innovation is the prime mover. A very wide selection of individuals has collaborated in this study and the Editors have treated the material assembled both skilfully and fairly in their overall analysis. One would like to see a wider adaptation of the study technique used in other similar situations for all too frequently there is a tendency for dogmatic statements to be made on the basis of studies of sectoral fragments of development situations – and the more complex the Rural Development spectrum the more unbalanced such can become. Those concerned with this study are to be congratulated on the painstaking manner in which they have studied the available literature, much of this unpublished material and this difficult to obtain. The great majority of the contributors were relatively late arrivals in East Africa and in consequence much of the examination of the scheme has been from the outside. Though there are numerous points made by individual contributors with which one might take issue – and indeed the Editors themselves had to face this problem – the manner of presentation is such as to invoke thought about the multitude of choices that had to be made at different stages of this fascinating and successful development.

The writer's own association with the scheme covered the period 1953-1964, first as Chief Research Officer and later as Director of Agriculture in the Department of Agriculture. It is also pertinent to add that his first safari on the Mwea Plains was in 1937 when a study was being made of what came to be known as the 'Great Cotton Fiasco'.

This book gives fair treatment of technical issues, recognises the need for research and the development of a successful production package; without these the scheme would have got nowhere.

The comparison with Perkerra is significant and of considerable interest. In particular the story of the development of the onion crop there has been faithfully told. As in most things in this life luck plays a part, e.g. closure of the Suez Canal raised the issue of local onion production and research on

this crop was initiated. Prior to this much of Kenya's onion requirement had been supplied from Egypt. Again the availability of Sindano rice which fortuitously played a very important part in developments at Mwea was another example.

The book rightly pays tribute to the succession of capable managers on the Mwea Settlement but one is left with a feeling that perhaps there is implied criticism of the disciplinary system. In this connection it should not be forgotten that even when a package was developed, its successful implementation would have been impossible without some form of scheme discipline because in an irrigation scheme, success depends completely on the timing of operations, especially in relation to availability of water and its distribution to the farms throughout the scheme area. Without some effective form of discipline the scheme would have failed. It should also be noted that this type of scheme cannot afford too high a proportion of poor performers among its tenant farmers, and thus an adequate disciplinary system is of vital importance not only for those individual farmers but in the national interest. The Government of Kenya had invested heavily in the Mwea Settlement and could not afford to see its development wasted.

In general it would have been an advantage to have included contributions from more individuals who were concerned from the beginning but this lack does not detract from an excellent book which is very strongly recommended for study by those interested in broader aspects of Rural Development based on the development of innate agricultural potential.

A. R. MELVILLE

The Lebanese Traders of Sierra Leone, by H. L. VAN DER LAAN. *Mounton & Co., The Hague*; pp. 385 incl. notes & index; Dutch Guilders 32.50; £6.20

This work is one of a series on change and continuity in Africa, published under the auspices of the Afrika Studiecentrum in Leiden. It is the product of Dr. van der Laan's ten years' work as Associate Professor of Economics at Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone.

It is now 80 years since the first Lebanese traders came to Sierra Leone, driven out of their native land by the oppression of the Turkish Empire. On the whole they have prospered; many of them have become economically comfortable, a few, probably, are rich. Their numbers have increased to over eight thousand, and they have been accepted as more or less permanent residents. On the other hand, they have been denied citizenship of Sierra Leone and their economic success has led to their being restricted and sometimes harassed in their trading. Their lot has been similar to that of Jews in some countries, and of Indians in others. They have been generally tolerated, but occasionally threatened or pressed, particularly since the establishment of independent Sierra Leone in 1961.

Dr. van der Laan is essentially an economist, and it is the economic progress and checks of the Lebanese that form the main theme of the book.

But he does not ignore the social and the political aspects of the story. He describes it all, with scrupulous impartiality and scholarly exactitude. It would be misleading to call the description of their lives and conditions either vivid or lively. But it is very thorough, very exact, and presented in straighforward and readable English.

Their situation today is uneasy; the republican government of Siaka Stevens treats them as long term or permanent residents, but they know that they are there on sufferance. The prosperity of the great days of the diamond boom in the 1950s has passed, and life is more difficult. The treatment of Asians in Uganda inevitably makes them apprehensive; but the idea of returning to Lebanon has lost any attraction it ever had, particularly in the last few months.

One can but speculate about the future of this community. Dr. van der Laan allows himself a final forecast – that many of the Lebanese will move on, perhaps to other African countries further down the coast; the number in Sierra Leone will decline, as will also the quality of their commercial participation: it will be less optimistic and less determined. This may well be so. But it is a rather sad conclusion. It reminds one faintly of that area of Sierra Leone around Bonthe, where the buildings subside slowly into the marsh, and the houses need urgently a coat of paint they will never get. There is an air of hopelessness about Bonthe, and a similar spirit seems to be pervading the Lebanese. They have made their contribution to Sierra Leone; they have traded, and bought and sold, but there is not much left now. Sierra Leone no longer seems to need them.

B. KEITH-LUCAS

Problems of Cooperation for Development, by GERALD M. MEIER; *Oxford University Press*, 1974; pp. 249; £2.90.

Professor Meier can always be relied upon to clarify and stimulate and this book is well up to the high standard we have come to expect of him. He aims at exploring "the ways by which governments, international organizations, and multinational enterprises can cooperate in re-orienting development strategy towards more effective 'outward-looking policies' and policies of 'redistribution through growth' ". (P.vii). He focuses his analysis on foreign aid, private overseas investment and international trade.

Professor Meier begins by referring to the disenchantment and disillusionment that have already set in. "Few of the poor countries have been able to achieve the major objectives of their development plans: a rapid increase in per capita income, a high level of employment, a reduction of inequalities in income distribution, the avoidance of marked disparities in the growth of different regions within the country." (P.4). It is perhaps hardly surprising that there have not been many successes here. This particular set of objectives is almost bound to lead to disillusionment as it is virtually impossible to achieve all in a single package.

When he turns to private overseas investment Professor Meier presents a balanced picture of the arguments for and against. With regard to the big

multi-national corporations he maintains that, "the relevant profit is that of the total net worth of the investor's interests, not that of the individual subsidiary alone." (P.102). This is true. Private companies cannot assure a continuous income flow by taxation as can governments; so if they do not get an adequate return on their resources they go out of business. But the "global scanning capacity" to which Professor Meier refers is very complex and indeed rigid. Real investment is for a long time and it is this which makes the private sector look for certainty and continuity rather than quick returns on an in and out basis. Thus once an investment plan has been determined and the relevant investment made one is stuck with it. Even if one wants to pull out in the interests of total net worth there may be many political, social and administrative constraints that make this very difficult indeed.

The third section of the book is a very helpful survey of the trade problems of the developing countries although such is the pace of events in the modern world that some of it now looks a little dated. Even so with UNCTAD IV coming up it is always valuable to have so clear an exposition of the issues.

The format of the book is extremely clear although unfortunately it does not have an index. But it is short and racy enough to enable one to refer pretty quickly to the relevant sections. The division of the analysis of the main themes into "context", "issues", and "questions" plus the lists of books for further reading at the end of every section is admirable and makes the book especially suitable for students to read and think for themselves about the problems under discussion.

TOM SOPER

Land Administration: a Bibliography for Developing Countries, by H. W. WEST and O. H. M. SAWYER; *Department of Land Economy, Cambridge*, 1975; index of authors and countries, pp. 291; £2.50.

The appearance of this Bibiliography, which will be of considerable interest and practical use to all concerned with land policy and land administration in the developing world, provides an opportunity to draw attention also to the publication by the Department of Land Economy in the University of Cambridge of a new series of 'Occasional Papers', the first of which appeared in 1974. The series is intended to develop greater awareness of the interplay of legal, institutional, economic and social forces affecting the use of land. The four papers so far published reflect research carried out by present members of the Department on various land issues in the United Kingdom and Ireland. It is hoped, however, that past members of staff and students of the Department and others in the academic and professional world will also contribute; future Occasional Papers may therefore cover land issues in overseas countries as well.

Brief details of these four Occasional Papers are:

(No. 1) *Measurement of Urban Land Use* by R. C. Fordham (1974, 72 pages) contains a critique of existing estimates of urban land use in the United Kingdom, a description of a method of land use

measurement using systematic point sampling from Ordnance Survey maps, and the results of an application of this method to urban land use.

(No. 2) *Mobility of Farm Workers* by Ruth Gasson (1974, 96 pages) is concerned with the drift from the land and the effects of proximity to towns and other jobs on the supply of labour available for agriculture in England and Wales.

(No. 3) *Land Reform in Ireland* by C. F. Kolbert and T. O'Brien (1975, 76 pages) traces the history of tenurial changes in Ireland to the present day with an account of their social, political and economic causes and effects; an account is also given of recent measures to deal with the remaining problems of congested areas and the accession of Ireland to membership of the EEC.

(No. 4) *Provision of Tied Cottages* by Ruth Gasson (1975, 147 pages) describes trends in the provision of tied houses for workers in England, Scotland and Wales, the legal situation and arguments for and against the tied cottage system.

The books in this series are printed at the University Library, Cambridge, and bound in hard covers. At £1.20 (£1.50 in the case of Occasional Paper No. 4) they are exceptionally good value for these inflationary times. They are obtainable by direct application from the Department of Land Economy, 19 Silver Street, Cambridge CB3 9EP.

The Bibliography is a substantially larger work than any of the Occasional Papers and does not form part of the same series, although it is bound in a matching hard cover and is also printed at the Cambridge University Library. Its scope is precisely described in the Preface. As its title makes clear, it is confined to publications concerned with developing countries, which are listed. (Italian or Czech readers may be surprised to see their country included in this list). It is further limited by language and date to material published in English from the beginning of 1960 to the end of 1973 – but, to take a well known quotation from a different context, "more would have been inhuman".

'Land administration' is not a term with a universally accepted and precise meaning. The main subjects covered in the Bibliography are listed in the Preface under two general headings of "Land ownership, tenure and law" and "Land policy and administration". All readers may not understand the principle on which the various subjects are divided between these two general headings, but this is unimportant since the subjects themselves are specified. They include capability studies and planning land use, but publications dealing with the techniques of land use are excluded. The Bibliography does not attempt to include an inventory of statutes, although it does include references to relevant items in FAO's *Food and Agriculture Legislation*.

The term 'publication' embraces all relevant books, articles in journals, reports, papers and proceedings of conferences, but not university theses or taped material. However, the Bibliography notes only four IBRD publications – all in the country 'Economic Development' series – presumably because the availability of the numerous other IBRD reports containing relevant material on land subjects is often restricted.

Within these stated limitations the aim of the authors has been to include *all* relevant material. This is a brave target. Although the Bibliography is confined to publications concerned with developing countries, it is not of course confined to publications emanating from those countries. Academic institutions in particular – in Britain, the developed countries of the Commonwealth and the USA – are increasingly interesting themselves in problems of developing countries. The output of literature is prodigious. No doubt some readers will be able by virtue of their local knowledge to point to occasional omissions affecting their own countries or, by dint of much research, omissions affecting other countries as well, but I know from my own experience that it will not be an easy task to fault the authors.

The entries are arranged in a geographical rather than on a thematic basis in a general section and five continental sections each divided into countries. Within each country division the entries are arranged in alphabetical order of authors' names. A book dealing with more than one country is noted in the appropriate continental section, those parts of the book which refer to individual countries being included in each of the relevant country divisions. There are in all some 4,200 entries, although the device mentioned in the preceding sentence means that the total number of separate publications is slightly smaller.

As Professor Denman points out in his foreword, "there is a new literature abroad today – the work of numerous authors whose trained minds and experience command a special knowledge of the land affairs of developing countries. Books, articles and memoranda abound, scattered throughout the continent and countries of the world". This output will continue and almost certainly increase. It would be encouraging to learn that the authors intended later to produce further editions containing publications subsequent to 1973. I gather, however, that their experience has been similar to that of the applicant for a job in a circus, who offered as his stunt a dive from a fifty-foot high platform into a barrel of sawdust. The incredulous circus manager asked for a demonstration, which was successfully provided. He immediately offered the applicant a contract on generous terms, but this was refused despite several offers to raise the pay further. When asked why he persisted in his refusal to accept any offer, the applicant replied that his demonstration was the first occasion on which he had tried his stunt and "he did not like it".

So for the time being we must be content, count our good fortune in having this useful Bibliography and hope that others will be inspired by the efforts of Dr. West and Miss Sawyer to carry on the good work. I know of no other Bibliography covering similar subjects in such detail. FAO's valuable *Bibliography on Land Tenure* covers all countries of the world and includes publications in languages other than English. However, the last edition, containing works published between 1958 and 1970, contains substantially fewer English titles for most countries than this Bibiliography. That there is a need for a detailed bibliography of this nature is indisputable and, as the authors claim, it will be of considerable value to all concerned with the formation, appraisal and execution of plans for the administration and development of land in developing countries, whether in the public service, commerce and industry or academic circles.

J. C. D. LAWRANCE

The Study of Government, Political Science and Public Administration, by F. F. RIDLEY; *George Allen & Unwin*, 1975; index; pp. 240; £3.35 (paperback).

Professor Ridley states in his preface with reference to the study of government and administration that, "The focus of study, . . . should be institutional, the method comparative, the purpose practical". It should also have, "a reformist intent". He compares the study of politics as an academic discipline, and a fairly new one at that, with other disciplines arguing that the true focus of the study has gone astray with its more fashionable emphasis on the behavioural approach and what the writers on organisations refer to as the "informal" rather than "formal" aspects of organisation. His contention is that there is a need to return to the study of the formal arangements in governments. Hence the interest in "institutions" – the meaning of which he spends a considerable amount of space discussing with reference to the literature on government, politics and organisation theory. His own view is, "that an institution is not a custom that grows naturally, not a behavioural pattern that emerges through the interaction of men, not a structure created by social forces: it is something invented, deliberately established and ordered, and therefore it has a rational and formal base (p. 33). Further, "Political institutions are the framework of rules within which the actors in a political situation must operate" (p. 36). Professor Ridley expresses his belief that a knowledge of both constitutional law and administrative law are important to the study of government and regrets that more British political scientists do not apparently share this view. After all, he reasonably claims, "the actual work of government has to be carried out through legally established institutions, and in many cases according to legally defined procedures" (p 36). Even issues like the improvement of morale in the administration, while largely dependent on human relationships, are unlikely to be accomplished without changes in either the form of the organisation or the rules governing it, or both. Also included in the initial two chapters dealing with the main argument on the study of politics are discussions on 'values' and 'goals'. He concludes chapter 2 (p. 42) by saying: "The purpose of studying political institutions is above all the discussion of ends and means. That is the traditional role of the political scientist and it remains his task".

The chapter, "Comparison as a Practical Activity" is a revised version of a fairly recent article. It stresses the importance of comparison in the study but at the same time analyses the use of comparison and emphasises the dangers that are inherent in this method. The approach is refreshingly practical and it is good to hear someone declare that, ". . . the purpose of comparison is to see how the institutions of one's own country can be reformed . . ." Incidentally, it is also a pleasure to read a scholar of Professor Ridley's stature criticising the use of such irritating and overworked phrases as "conceptual framework" that are so loved by lesser political scientists. He suggests that there are three essential levels of legitimate comparison in political studies. First, the simple juxtaposition of foreign country accounts. Second, the straightforward comparison of specific institutions – with some evaluation and thought about transferability. Third, comparison intended to develop scientific theory. The final and lengthy chapter in the

section on political science looks at how the academic study of foreign institutions can contribute to ideas and provide practical lessons on government. It does so almost entirely through the use of illustrations entitled "public enterprise", "Chancellor and Ombudsman", "specialists and generalists" and "integrated administrative decentralisation".

Following the theoretical argument contained in the first part of the book, the second section is concerned with the study of public administration. The material appears to be more recent and is certainly fresher; and the illustrations, being very much shorter, are embodied in the thesis. Even the chapter described as "illustrations" is an historical analysis of the literature on public administration and of its development as an identifiable subject rather than a case study.

Professor Ridley's "Cause for Discontent" is that Britain is still an underdeveloped country as far as the establishment of Public Administration as an academic subject. This opening contention is supported by some convincing evidence and it is pointed out that until very recently (1970) there were very few British books of significance on Public Administration, while in U.S.A. a substantial volume of literature began to appear in the mid-1920's. In both Germany and France, Public Administration was studied much earlier though the tradition was admittedly broken. Professor Ridley is surprised that political scientists, particularly since today so many are interested in the study of politics as a system of inputs and outputs, should take so little interest in the administration which, "is the box in which inputs are actually translated into outputs (p. 156), and opt for psephology instead.

Among reasons he advances for this state of affairs is that the subject has been captured by the economists and human relationships people in the business management schools or by the sociologists. He concludes that as there are so many different approaches to the study of Public Administration it becomes such an interdisciplinary subject that it does have a right to declare its independence from political science. He is less convinced, at this stage, that it can claim to be a discipline of its own.

The main theme of the chapter on the role of the universities is that there should be a far more utilitarian approach. The plea is that universities should do something directly useful both through their teaching and their research. Professor Ridley is not suggesting that they should take responsibility for administrative training but that there is a practical need for more education in the subject for both administrators and others. This is particularly relevant at the post-graduate level. He points to the problems of trying to design and manage satisfactory interdisciplinary courses within the traditional university, which leads him to advocate the establishment of one or two "Schools of Public Administration". Finally, believe it or not, he tentatively suggests that, "there is a good case for some state intervention" (p. 225)!

Notwithstanding rather a lot of repetition and some discontinuity that surely springs from overdependence on previous articles, this is a very stimulating book and one which hopefully will have a significant influence on the study and teaching of Public Administration. The style is crisp and

straightforward and the total absence of diverting footnotes is welcome though the absence of a select bibliography is to be regretted. Books and articles by Professor Ridley and others well known at the Public Administration Committee conferences have made a major contribution to the study of government and administration in Britain and other metropolitan countries. When, one wonders, is this going to be extended to the Third World?

W. A. P. REILLY

Political Structure in a Changing Sinhalese Village, by MARGUERITE S. ROBINSON; *Cambridge University Press*; *Cambridge South Asian Studies* 16; appendices, glossary, bibliography and index; pp. 376, £9.75.

Sri Lanka has yielded a rich harvest of anthropological studies in the spheres of kinship and land-tenure. Dr. Robinson's book deals with an aspect which had not yet been taken up for detailed analysis, and can therefore be regarded as pioneering. Her theme is the structural change in the nature of politics at the village level. The book sets an example of detailed observation conducted with meticulous care which is characteristic of analytical ethnography. She focuses her attention on a single village, Morapitiya (a pseudonym), but moves effectively from the microstructure to the macrostructure of Sri Lanka politics which is a distinctive and commendable feature of her analysis. Another merit of the book is the analysis of complete record of disputes in the village recorded in the village headmen's diary over a period of forty years (1921-61). It lends substance to her claim of having a recorded actual structural change in the field, a task which has not hitherto been accomplished by students of political anthropology.

The book is divided in four parts: The Village of Morapitiya, Traditional Political Structure, The Political System in Transition, and The Morapitiyan Colonists. The movement from part II to part III is devoted to the structural change in village policy from P–1 to P–2 as the author calls the traditional and emergent political structures respectively. The political structure of Morapitiyan colonists is designated P–2A. The long introduction to the village is important for subsequent analysis in two major respects. Firstly, the dynamics of status – intracaste ranking of the household groups and compounds – even in this mono-caste (Goyigama) village is of much consequence for political alignments. Secondly, the intravillage patterns of customary cooperative labour provide the main gauge for measuring change in the composition of disputing groups. In the actual delineation of disputes the author presents a quantitative picture by classifying the kinds of dispute and the nature of abuse involved in them. She is able to show an inverse correlation between the manageability of disputes within the village and the incidence of violence as distinct from abuse. Courts are usually kept at bay – litigation through them is exhorbitantly expensive – except in cases of long-standing land disputes. There are no factions in the traditional political structure (P–1) but a pattern of shifting alliances around the same set of leaders. Indeed one of the salient findings of this study is that none of the traditional caste and kinship groups provide the focus for political activity. As a remarkable *volte face* in relation to other studies in political anthropology,

Dr. Robinson asserts and convincingly demonstrates that the pattern of village politics studied by her is characterized by leaders without groups rather than by groups without leaders.

This departure from the orthodoxy of studies in political anthropology has made her task of perceiving structural change at once feasible, illuminating (and highly absorbing for the reader). She is able to state clearly the 'rules of the game' for P–1, and the way they dissolve under the very eyes of the investigator, giving rise to the regimen of P–2. Given the limitation of space this review is only able to skim the surface of her interesting theoretical application. (I would not call it 'innovation' because the analytical framework owes much to the writings of F. G. Bailey, as acknowledged by the author herself). However, some of her substantive findings need to be summarized.

One of the major imperatives for leadership in Moripitya is that the men competing for it should also participate in the wider Kotmale arena. The routes of access to influential outsiders are diverse – utilization of kinship and business ties, manipulation of associational ties with 'old boys' and with co-workers at Kotmale schools and offices, development of economic ties with the roadside shops, use of courts and participation in the decisions of the Village Committee. This imperative hasn't changed between 1963 and 1967. In fact the crisis of leadership in the latter period is precisely due to the lack of known routes of access to the new powerful outsiders. This situation adversely affects village leadership and political process since the new rules are at loggerheads with the old ones. There is no clear direction to the village-level politics. But one trend has emerged very clearly: "The vacuum has been filled, at least for the present, by the development of political party factions." (p. 275).

In the concluding chapter, the author touches on the question of the generalizability of her findings to other villages of Sri Lanka, and beyond that, to the changing structures of rural polity in South Asia. The question is tackled both at the theoretical and practical levels. As regards the integrative and divisive aspects of conflict in P–1, P–2, and P–2A, she has this to say: "Rules limiting conflict to confrontations and a widespread network of cross-cutting ties made P–1 a model in which conflict was primarily integrative. The integration theory of conflict, however, can not explain the disputes of P–2 in which conflict takes the form of encounter and fight among actors following different sets of rules. *Within the Village*, conflict in P–1 performed an integrative function whereas the conflict of P–2 is largely divisive. Whether one terms the former 'positive' and the latter 'negative', however, depends upon whether the perpetuation of P–1 is considered desirable. From the national viewpoint, the 'divisive' conflict of P–2 may be more 'integrative' than that of P–1. The lack of conflict in P–2A is perhaps the most divisive of all." (p. 277). At the practical level, the author emphasises the irreversibility of the change, which has undoubted relevance for our understanding of similar processes in the developing rural areas of South Asia. In this respect Dr. Robinson's account is diagnostic of all situations where changes ushered in by national policy and implemented by state bureaucarcy are changing the lives of the villagers.

R. K. JAIN

Sir Donald Cameron – Colonial Governor, by HARRY A. GAILEY; *Hoover Colonial Studies, Stanford University*; bibliography & index; pp. 181; $9.

British responsibility for Tanganyika lasted no more than forty years, first under League of Nations Mandate, then under UN Trusteeship. That a remarkably smooth course was plotted towards an independence that came before that of Uganda or Kenya, was in no mean measure due to three outstanding Governors who held office for almost half the period – Cameron, Twining and Turnbull.

Every so often the Colonial Office brought to the top an officer whose background and early career in no way earmarked him for high command – one such was Cameron. Little is known of his formative years or of his education except that it was limited, and that his first post in Guyana was in a very subordinate capacity. It is clear, however, that while still in relatively junior clerical office he greatly impressed Governor Boyle who took Cameron with him on his promotion to Mauritius. Despite one crisis on the island when he offended local sentiments, Cameron never looked back. After proving his worth in an African environment, in Nigeria, he became Governor of Tanganyika in 1924 and it is on his six years there that his reputation really stands.

Harry Gailey's history is a bit sketchy and sometimes open to question, but his picture of Cameron in Tanganyika is well portrayed. The material is here for a John Drinkwater-style historical play – Cameron in the title part, Grigg the "foe", the powerful figures of Amery and Lugard in the background, Philip Mitchell in support, Gowers seconding Grigg. Certainly the author focuses correctly on Cameron's main achievements: the paramountcy of African interests, opposition to closer union with Kenya (and Uganda), the development of local government through Lugard's method of Indirect Rule by Chiefs, and the establishment of a local judicial system administering customary law and Rules and Orders made by the new Native Authorities; setting up an enlightened and, alas, short-lived Labour Department. He toured extensively, he produced guidelines to be followed by the Provincial Administration, his Native Administration Memoranda was indeed the administrator's "bible". Inevitably mistakes were made. The resuscitation of long moribund chiefdoms in the coastal area where first Arab then German direct rule had obliterated any sense of local cohesion, meant a plethora of petty chiefs quite incapable of providing any form of effective administration. Administrative officers who pointed this out were held in disfavour and further reform had to await Cameron's departure. Determined to set up a workable Native Administration and equally determined to withstand political pressure for East African closer union, Cameron acted firmly and fast, and despite the mistakes he achieved a remarkable degree of success. No one was left in any doubt that the purpose of British rule in Tanganyika was to lead the African people towards self-government, however far distant that appeared at the time. He created the base on which Twining was able to introduce major constitutional change, and Turnbull, in notable harmony with Nyerere, the final arrangements for complete independence. Had not Cameron obtained a clearly recognized special

position for Tanganyika, the task facing Governors Twining and Turnbull would have been infinitely more difficult and the political pressures to "go slow" (with the probable implications of African passive resistance) would have been all the greater.

While no definitive life of Cameron, this volume does provide a well balanced, valuable assessment of a notable Colonial Administrator, one that Tanzanians will find of considerable interest when they study the British interlude in their history, and they will surely feel gratitude towards a Governor who did so much to make their progress towards independence both peaceful and assured.

PETER JOHNSTON

Agricultural Extension in Ujamaa Village Development, H. HANSEL, J. DE VRIES & P. C. NDEDYA (Eds.); *Faculty of Agriculture, University of Dar es Salaam;* pp. 292; Shs. (T) 40.00; $(US) 5.00.

This volume contains the report of a Workshop held at Morogoro, Tanzania, in September 1975 and attended by some 50 participants, mostly government officials and academics in a variety of posts related to rural development – a third of them expatriates.

What is needed in a publication of this kind, if it is intended for a wider readership than just the participants, is for the editors to provide either an introduction or a concluding chapter which puts the whole proceedings into a balanced perspective and highlights and assesses the main conclusions drawn and the most striking discussions that took place. Here we find merely a list of recommendations set down without comment or assessment, followed by the main papers and an impersonal summary of discussions. This is a pity as the theme of the workshop was one of very great interest, and of immense importance to Tanzania since on the success of the Ujamaa village experiment depends the success of the TANU Government.

It is interesting to note that under new 1975 legislation registered villages run on co-operative lines are allowed alongside the communal-style Ujamaa villages. Every village has an assembly of the whole adult population and a council which divides into committees. The need for a competent well-trained extension service working parallel with village committees and with wide functions is stressed. Extension through trained village experts and government specialists (not generalists) is recommended. Most of the extension service proposals, including training, are straightforward. One senses however, with regard to the recommendations on educational methods, that some of the workshop members regarded themselves as "we" and the peasantry as "them" (peasants we are told have a low consciousness of their position, government workers are a force for peasant development through "liberating education", "conscientizing educational methods" is essential – defined as a process of peasant self-examination). One can feel quite sure that President Nyerere would not approve of any arrogant air of superiority being assumed by the educated élite towards the rural peasantry. Yet here it

seems the "government workers" would like to mould the peasantry into an obedient pattern that would fit their theories of how villagers should behave. They need to remember that one of the basic principles of Ujamaa – "togetherness" – is one of equality for all citizens, not the superiority of one group over another. Notwithstanding these comments, the Workshop was clearly a valuable opportunity for a wide-ranging group of rural developers to concentrate together on formulating practical policies for improving the Tanzanian extension service to Ujamaa villages.

P. H. J.

Book Notes

Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa, by B. O. NWABUEZE; *C. Hurst & Co., London;* index; pp. 442; £8.40.

Professor Nwabueze writes fluently and well. The University of Zambia must be fortunate to have this distinguished Nigerian academic lawyer as head of its Department of Law. Here he reviews the varying patterns of Commonwealth constitutions in Africa – drawn from a common source yet each one varying from the next. While he rightly suggests that the search for the ideal constitution may be an elusive enterprise, by and large the Presidential Constitutions of Commonwealth Africa, he thinks, "have blended together what is good in the British and American systems". He points to France's Presidential form of government and to that unexpected state of affairs, the British movement towards Prime-Ministerial Government (so that a Premier today with a slender majority and conflict within his own party, is more strongly in control of affairs of state than his predecessors of 10 or 20 years ago). Presidential membership of the legislature, as in Kenya, has advantages in that this can lead to discontented MPs being persuaded at formal Parliamentary meetings to desist from their opposition to the Party line. It does not of course mean that where persuasion fails, strong executive action may not be taken.

The author accepts that a President who exercises executive power and who also controls the process of legislation arouses fear of dictatorship. In Commonwealth Africa he considers that Presidentialisms have tended "towards dictatorship and tyranny not so much because of its great power as because of insufficient constitutional, political and social restraint upon that power".

This is a volume to be commended to Presidents, to constitutional lawyers and historians, to political scientists and to students in these disciplines. The general reader with wide African interests will find much here that will add to his knowledge of a great and once dark continent.

Local Government and Politics in the Sudan; JOHN HOWELL (Ed.); *Khartoum University Press;* appendices & index; pp. 142.

The main purpose of this well-edited small book is to provide suitable reading for students and administrative trainees at Khartoum University, an aim which has surely been achieved. John Howell and his colleagues in the University contribute eight individual chapters which provide a useful and balanced introduction to Local Government in the Sudan to-day – the heritage, indirect rule, the post-independent situation, subsequent reforms, political role of the LGO and, the role of Councillors, and sources of revenue are all dealt with briefly. The contributions have been collected, edited and where necessary revised from previously published material, apart from newly-written pieces on the Local Government Officer and Local Government finance. It is interesting to note that a major problem facing those in the Sudan who are anxious to see local government reform carried further, is the conservatism of the local Establishment – just because central government is deemed radical, does not mean that reformists can take the bit between their teeth – on the contrary, a cautious and gradual approach to change is required.

It is to be hoped that a series Sudanese Political Studies will now follow – with this volume providing the 'starter'.

Mozambique – Memoirs of a Revolution, by JOHN PAUL; *Penguin Books, London;* maps; pp. 228; 80p.

For some 14 years John Paul was an Anglican priest with the UMCA in Northern Mozambique, leaving owing to ill-health in 1970, when the Portuguese days in Africa were clearly numbered and he is able to add a hopeful epilogue dated February, 1975 after Costa Gomes had succeeded General Spinola as head of the new-look government of Portugal.

This book is well written – written in sadness as much as anger, at the excesses of the Colonial regime which grew more extreme as panic measures were used in the vain hope of turning back the inexorable tide of Frelimo's successful advance – excesses that wiped out, and more, any gains that some attempts at social integration had possibly achieved. One notes the remarkable self-deceit of the Portuguese that they were winning the military and political battle, even the hearts of the people, when the reverse was so obviously the truth.

An Anglican priest must have been specially suspect in Portuguese eyes and John Paul was lucky that he avoided the harsh treatment and torture accorded to his African friends and colleagues – since, as he put it "I had far more to do with Frelimo than any of them".

The impact of this small book is all the greater for its modesty and the author's deep sincerity. He is clearly telling a true story and that is propaganda enough.

Occasional Paper 74/2: Pour un Movement Autonome des Travailleurs Etrangers pour un Sociologie Politique des Migrations Internationale en Europe, by JOSE BAPTISTA; pp. 13 and index of previous pp.

Occasional Paper 74/3: The Treatment of Subsistence Economic Activity in the National Accounts of African Countries, by WILFRED A. NDONGKO; pp. 21, bibliography & index of previous pp.

Occasional Paper 74/4: The Harambee Movement in Educational Development, by SIMEON HONGO OMINDE; pp. 28, and index of previous pp.

Occasional Paper 74/5: Alternatives in Education; Tanzania: Education for Self-Reliance, by ANZA A. LEMA; pp. 45, bibliography and index of previous pp.
Published by the *Vienna Institute for Development.*

Paper 74/4 makes the point that with one of the highest fertility rates in the world, the population of Kenya could double in less than twenty-five years. Thus, the "Harambee Movement", which represents the concern of politicians and the public at the problems this growth-rate can cause, concentrates its main attention on education and health matters. The movement which is non-institutionalised and voluntary can be seen as a force for the mobilisation of capital investment in rural areas, when it is realised that about 10 per cent of the funds for rural projects come from Government sources, whereas, the bulk of its finances come from individual donors.

In contrast to the more traditional attitude to education followed in Kenya, in Paper 74/5 Dr. Lema presents a picture of the new and radical educational policies which Tanzania has adopted.

To many this is an exciting and radical approach, aimed at eliminating elitism and ensuring that basic education is tailored to meet the grass roots needs of mainly rural communities, aimed, too, at ensuring that good citizenship is proven before admittance to the University can be obtained. At village level primary school teachers are 'community' teachers with an exceedingly heavy work load (detrimental it can be argued to their school teaching functions). The author believes in the new system and his approach is, perhaps, rather too uncritical – apart from his complaint at the lack of pupil-motivation in some schools, and at the failure of old educational ties to pass away as quickly as he would like.

Legislation and Education in Northern Nigeria, by ALBERT F. OGUNSOLA; *Oxford University Press,* 1975; maps and bibliography; index; pp. 111; £2.90.

Dr. Ogunsola is director of the Institute of Education at Ahmadu Bello University and in this small volume he sets out with admirable clarity the development of education and its administration in Northern Nigeria, illustrated by the legislative

process from the Education Ordnance of 1882 (and in detail from that of 1916) to that of 1962. The author concludes with a chapter on "The way Ahead" in which he expresses the hope that local education authorities will be democratized with local control in the hands of the people at local level, rather than centralized in the hands of State Governments as the National Curriculum Conference has recommended. "Government control should not necessarily mean direct government management of schools" – let, he suggests, local education authorities "be strengthened and improved" so as to perform the functions of school management effectively. There will be many who will hope that events will take this latter course.

The book contains a useful definition of educational terms and it should prove not only interesting but also helpful to teachers in training in Nigeria who need to know how their educational system has evolved.

Methodology for Planning Technical Education, by JOZEF M. RITZEN and JUDITH B. BALDERSTON; *Praeger Special Studies Series, Martin Robertson,* 17 *Quick Street, London N1*; appendix, tables, figures, index; pp. 161; £8.25.

This volume which includes a case study of Polytechnics in Bangladesh, is the outcome of research initiated by Jozef Ritzen in 1969/70 when the country was still East Pakistan.

The authors distinguish three stages between the allocation of resources for education and meeting manpower requirements: first, financing education, based on the cost per student place and described by the finance and cost structure of the system; second, the student flow (involving drop-out, repetition and promotion elements); and third, employment and graduates finding jobs, and at what salaries and are they at the level trained for?

The authors devise a system of quadratic programming so as to provide educational planners with the mathematical tool with which to decide on the policies needed to operate the Polytechnics as geared to the Bangladesh education system. They admit that the doubtful accuracy and inadequacy of some available data set them a serious problem, and so, no doubt wisely, they concentrated on planning techniques rather than data collection and they express confidence that their "decision model" may have relevance for educational planners beyond those in a developing country.

The applicability of any carefully proposed planning proposal such as theirs must inevitably depend on how far the political decision-makers are convinced that the mathematic formulae with which they are presented is credible and practical in political as well as educational terms.

Higher Education in Developing Nations – A Selected Bibliography, 1969–1974, by PHILIP G. ALTBACH and DAVID H. KELLY; *Martin Robertson, Quick Street, London;* pp. 229; £7.15.

Bibliographies appear in diverse shapes and sizes and they vary in the ease with which they can be used. Here is a model of its kind and both the authors and the publishers are to be commended on a beautifully prepared and very well arranged and referenced bibliography. The coverage is in no way limited to University level works on education, but includes general educational subjects, teacher training, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, etc. All concerned with education in the Third World will find this volume a valuable addition to their bookshelves.

Multi-National Firms in Africa; CARL WIDSTRAND (Ed.); *The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies,* 1975; pp. 425; Skr. 60.

This volume contains fourteen of the papers presented at a Seminar on Multinational Corporations held in the Fall of 1974 at Dakar.

At Seminars and Conferences, UN Agency meetings and academic symposia, the multinational corporations have been receiving a fairly severe flogging throughout the early Nineteen Seventies – and the process continues, stimulated by scandals revealed contemporaneously with Watergate. This volume, full of facts and thoughts and academic discussion, belongs to the current trend. It seems all too readily forgotten that a very great deal of economic development has been created, at risk, by major entrepreneurs who as costs have soared and the complexity of modern technology has increased, have tended to merge into international corporations.

It is probable that future historians will find that a great deal is owed to these major corporations for their development initiatives – for profit, yes, at risk, yes, but on enterprises which governments would not and, in most cases, could not have afforded to venture such vast expenditure from the public purse.

In this particular volume, unfortunately, there does not seem to be any description of the contributors, so it is not possible to assess whether or not the judgments made are based on adequate experience and knowledge.

The Elected Elite – A Socio-Economic Profile of Candidates in Tanzania's Parliamentary Election, 1970, by HELGE KJEKSHUS; *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies;* Research Report No. 29; pp. 41.

One must ask what real value can there be in the production of this sort of material some four years after the general election to which it refers and shortly before new elections are due to take place which may well alter the whole situation. The title of this short monograph is really too grand. The information provided here, if it is needed at all in such cursory and superficial form, should see the light of day within a few months of an election, and preferably on a comparative basis with at least one other election. One suspects that the object of this particular exercise was to enable the author to express a personal view which occupies – without any apparent great depth of knowledge – over eight pages (and an introduction which occupies nearly five), leaving not much over for the main text.

Let us hope that someone of Professor Jeyaicatnam Wilson's calibre will provide for Tanzania what he has done for Sri Lanka's election of May, 1970.

The State of Economic Development: Peru Since 1968, by E. V. S. FITZGERALD; *Cambridge University Press;* tables and bibliography; pp. 127; £5.50.

Dr. Fitzgerald's study of the Peruvian economic policies since the military coup of 1968 leads him to the view that the "Peruvian model" adopted has lessons for other Latin American countries and for developing countries elsewhere as well. The objectives were to reduce dependence on foreign capital, to effect a radical land reform and to base economic development on export-led industrialization. Nationalisation of the modern sector, with the traditional sector left unaffected, and large estates converted into workers' co-operatives have been the means followed to implement government policy. Foreign control over exports, finance and heavy industry eliminated, the reorganization of the important fishing industry, the re-negotiation of terms for further foreign investment, with the emergence of "a strong state from a previously weak and disarticulated public sector", amount in Dr. Fitzgerald's judgment to a considerable achievement and "a substantial step forward in the economic development of Peru". The dual nature of the structure of production now achieved leads him to the conclusion that the political equilibrium of Peru itself will need to move either right or left as further economic development takes place.

Dr. Fitzgerald worked with Peru's National Planning Commission and his visits in 1972 and 1974 were financed by research funds from Britain's Ministry of Overseas Development.

Industry, Employment and the Developing World. The Contribution of private foreign business to the employment objectives of developing countries. *Overseas Development Institute, London;* pp. 74; £1.50.

This well produced small volume provides the report on a joint ODI/British Institute of Management Seminar held at Oxford in November, 1974. The seminar which brought together representatives of government, business, trade unions, and the universities, to discuss the contribution that business – British business, in particular – can make to the employment objectives of developing countries, examined the conflicts of interest that can arise between the governments of developing countries and private foreign firms, over the issue of economic growth rates, and the contribution that each party has made to them, and, by extension, the share which should be allocated to each party.

Four papers were presented: "The Problem of Job Creation", by Richard Jolly; "The Mumias Sugar Company: A case-study of a Development in Kenya", by

J. A. Haynes; "Development and Employment: A case-study of India", by Dr. R. M. Honavar, and "The Transfer of Skills", by William Bell.

In summing up the proceedings, Edith Hodgkinson concluded that the Seminar had not succeeded in finding an easy way of achieving the employment objectives of developing countries; it had, though, succeeded in highlighting areas where the differing objectives of developing country governments and foreign private business could be reconciled "in a way conducive to the overall employment objective". In the present difficult economic climate "the need to keep open and develop the channels of resource transfer" is more urgent than ever.

South Africa – Black Labour/Swedish Capital; *TCO, Sweden;* pp. 193.

This volume contains the Report of a study delegation of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and the Central Organisation of Salaried Employees (TCO) in Sweden, to South Africa in September, 1975.

The delegation highlights the unsatisfactory conditions in which Africans work in Swedish-owned companies in South Africa and emphasises the social injustice of apartheid. It does not foresee far reaching and effective international trade union action to improve these conditions and looks rather towards continuing pressure, particularly through the UN, and the restraint or prohibition of investments. Support for African Trade Unions is urged together with support for the ICFTU's Committee on South Africa. The aim should be for realistic measures which can produce realistic results. The delegation concluded that rapid results could not be achieved but that their Trade Union movement should prevail upon Swedish companies in South Africa (i) to facilitate the formation of African Unions at these subsidiaries and to recognise them, (ii) to improve wages and work conditions and the security of employment, (iii) to provide continuous detailed information about their activities. The Swedish Government for its part is urged to tighten up regulations concerned with currency for investment and to increase its assistance to opponents and victims of apartheid.

Mindful Militants – The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia, 1920–72, by T. SHERIDAN; *Cambridge University Press,* 1976; selected bibliography and index; pp. 329; £7.50.

This story really begins with a small group of British Trade Unionists emigrating to Australia and creating there a branch of their Society (a policy also adopted by similar workers in other countries) which in due course became, in July, 1920, the AEU. Mr. Sheridan tells how the AEU became Australia's largest, richest and most aggressive manufacturing union, remaining an integral part of the UK union until the links were severed in 1968 "as a prelude to its amalgamation in 1972 with two other Australian Unions to form the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union". The history is fascinatingly told, with an explosive battle between left and right wings, enhanced by the Australian Labour Party's own split in the Nineteen Fifties, and lasting until the mid-1960s when the right wing forces admitted defeat and withdrew from the field.

Now boilermakers, blacksmiths, engineers and sheet metal workers form an immensely powerful industrial union, to which moulders, ironworkers and the Amalgamated Society of Engineers declined marriage, preferring to retain their own independent, but less important existence. It is this new large amalgamation of militant Unions which now unexpectedly faces possible problems (if not confrontation) with the new Fraser Government instead of developing relations with the Government of Gough Whitlam with which it doubtless anticipated several years of a fairly harmonious growing relationship.

Squatter Settlements in Developing Countries, by BARBARA BUICK; *Australian National University Press, Canberra;* index; pp. 158; $A4.95.

Barbara Buick introduces her very useful bibliography with a short perceptive Foreword. Over 2,000 entries includes a useful list of other bibliographies. Researchers will find the entries of special value but the general reader needs to guard against imagining that all the works listed are concerned with squatter settlements. The field covered is much larger, and thereby more useful – eg. Annual Town Planning Reports. One is surprised to find that Dovala has not been the subject of any known publication: maybe here are opportunities for urban researchers to note both fields covered are fields yet unexplored.

Sea Use Planning; ELIZABETH YOUNG and PETER FRICKS (Eds.); *Fabian Society, London;* pp. 35; 55p.

This Fabian tract contains seven short essays covering varied facets of sea use planning. With Britain's economic future dependant on North Sea Oil, the importance of the subject is indeed great. Among recommendations to be found here are: the appointment of a Secretary of State for Maritime Affairs, the setting up of a civilian off-shore constabulary, and above all it is stressed that "the North Sea is not a honey pot to be consumed once and for all" and that comprehensive sea use planning is now urgently needed in place of "the present commercial and bureaucratic scramble".

Ireland: A Directory and Yearbook 1976; *Institute of Public Administration, Dublin;* illus., maps, tables, index, pp. 320; £9.00.

A comprehensive summary of information and statistics, printed on good paper, and packed into one slim volume. Overseas readers who wish to obtain up-to-date information about Ireland need look no further.

The Land Law of German New Guinea, by PETER and BRIDGET SACK; *Australain National University Press,* 1975; bibliography, indexes and glossary; pp. 120; $A4.95.

The Supreme Court Library of newly-independent Papua New Guinea, the University and Schools, law offices and the Courts, now have available in this small volume a useful collection of the land laws introduced by the German authorities whose Colonial law applied to New Guinea from 1886 until 1921. It will be of particular value when land disputes arise which relate to acquisitions dating back to German times. This will be a valuable reference book for the legal profession and a useful addition to the records of a new State. The translations from the German required care and skill and Dr. Peter Sack provided the scholarship required.

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
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